Igor Douven (ed.)
Cambridge University Press (2020)
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We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' – at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.
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Reprint years | 2021 |
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ISBN(s) | 1108421911 9781108421911 1108433057 |
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