Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science

Philosophy of Science 78 (2):303-324 (2011)
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Abstract

Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science.

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