Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science

Philosophy of Science 78 (2):303-324 (2011)
Abstract
Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may contribute to a normative ideal, they have limited effectiveness for regulating how values influence science
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DOI 10.1086/659222
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References found in this work BETA
Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1977 - In The Essential Tension. University of Chicago Press. pp. 320--39.
A New Program for Philosophy of Science?Ronald N. Giere - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):15-21.
The Role of Values in Expert Reasoning.Heather Douglas - 2008 - Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (1):1-18.
Believing What One Ought.John Heil - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (11):752-765.

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Citations of this work BETA
State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott & David Willmes - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):807-817.
Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.

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