Species, higher taxa, and the units of evolution

Philosophy of Science 58 (1):84-101 (1991)
Abstract
A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289600
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,208
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
What is Analytic Metaphysics For?James Maclaurin & Heather Dyke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):291-306.
Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):789-802.
On the Nature of the Species Problem and the Four Meanings of 'Species'.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (1):135-158.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Species Pluralism and Anti-Realism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):103-120.
Large-Scale Biological Entities and the Evolutionary Process.Niles Eldredge - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:551-566.
Changing Conceptions of Species.Bradley E. Wilson - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):405-420.
What's Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism.Marc Ereshefsky - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):674-685.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

64 ( #82,448 of 2,172,658 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #172,670 of 2,172,658 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums