Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori

Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-9 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.

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10.1007/s44204-024-00137-y

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Claire Field
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

A range of replies.Daniel Whiting - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (16).
Publisher Correction: Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-1.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.

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