Defense of a Truthmaker Approach to Counterfactuals’: Response to Andrew Bacon’s ‘Counterfactuals, Infinity and Paradox

In Federico L. G. Faroldi & Frederik Van De Putte (eds.), Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-classical Logic. Springer Verlag. pp. 389-406 (2023)
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Abstract

I defend the truthmaker approach to counterfactuals against certain objections that Andrew Bacon has made in his paper.

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10.1007/978-3-031-29415-0_18

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Kit Fine
New York University

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