Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):245-273 (2001)
Keynes's A Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1921) contains some quite unusual concepts, such as non-numerical probabilities and the ‘weights of the arguments’ that support probability judgements. Their controversial interpretation gave rise to a huge literature about ‘what Keynes really did mean’, also because Keynes's later views in macroeconomics ultimately rest on his ideas on uncertainty and expectations formation.
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Johannes von Kries’s Principien: A Brief Guide for the Perplexed.Sandy Zabell - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):131-150.
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