Journal of Ethics 1 (1):45-64 (1997)
Previously, I have argued that moral responsibility for actions is associated with guidance control. This sort of control does not necessarily involve the freedom to do otherwise. In this paper I extend the view to apply to omissions. That is, moral responsibility for an omission is associated with guidance control of that omission. This helps to provide a systematic, unified account of moral responsibility.
|Keywords||control free will moral responsibility omissions|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Reprint years||2004, 2016|
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