The Journal of Ethics

ISSNs: 1382-4554, 1572-8609

11 found

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  1.  9
    Moral Transformation as Shifting (Im)Possibilities.Silvia Caprioglio Panizza & Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):195-210.
    The phenomenon of moral transformation, though important, has received little attention in virtue ethics. In this paper we propose a virtue-ethical model of moral transformation as character transformation by tracking the development of new identity-defining (‘core’) character traits, their expressions, and their priority structure, through the change in what appears as possible or impossible to the moral agent. We propose that character transformation culminates when what previously appeared as morally possible to the agent now appears impossible, i.e. unconceived and unthinkable, (...)
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  2.  6
    An Intuitive, Abductive Argument for a Right against Mental Interference.Thomas Douglas - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):133-154.
    Several authors have recently claimed that we each possess a right against interference with our minds. However, it remains unclear how this claim is to be justified. I offer a novel argument in defence of it. The argument is intuitive—appealing centrally to intuitions regarding cases—and abductive—taking the form of an inference to the best explanation; I offer a series of cases involving intuitively wrongful interventions, argue that five somewhat promising attempts to account for the wrongfulness of these interventions leave some (...)
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  3.  1
    Rising above Reactive Scaffolding.Dane Leigh Gogoshin - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):85-110.
    This paper puts forward a novel, two-tiered view of moral agency which captures the key concerns of two competing theories. According to the capacitarian view, in order for someone to be an appropriate target of the reactive attitudes and practices, they must possess an independent, objective capacity for recognizing and responding to moral reasons. According to the moral influence view, this capacity fully depends for both development and maintenance on reactive scaffolding. I will argue that the moral influence view cannot (...)
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  4.  13
    Against Metasemantics-First Moral Epistemology.Jesse Hambly & Shang Long Yeo - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):111-131.
    Moral metasemantic theories explain how our moral thought and talk are about certain properties. Given the connection between what our moral terms are about and which moral claims are true, it might be thought that metasemantic theorising can justify first-order ethical conclusions, thus providing a novel way of doing moral epistemology. In this paper, we spell out one kind of argument from metasemantic theories to normative ethical conclusions, and argue that it fails to transmit justification from premises to conclusion. We (...)
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  5.  27
    (1 other version)Fittingness and Well-Being.Brad Hooker - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):175-193.
    Mental states (beliefs, emotions, moods, desires, etc.) towards things can fit or fail to fit those things. Perhaps actions can fit or fail to fit the situations in which they are done. This paper explores whether having fitting mental states and doing fitting actions can constitute additions to a person’s well-being. The paper first discusses the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being. Then the paper considers hedonistic theories of well-being and criticises the recent proposal from Rossi and Tappolet that well-being consists only (...)
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  6.  6
    Welfare Subjectivism, Sophistication, and Procedural Perfectionism.Shu Ishida - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):155-174.
    Welfare subjectivists face a dilemma. On the one hand, traditional subjectivist theories—such as the desire-fulfillment theory—are too permissive to account for the well-being of typical mature human beings. On the other hand, more “refined” theories—such as the life-satisfaction theory—are too restrictive to account for the well-being of various welfare subjects, including newborns, those with profound cognitive impairments, or non-human animals. This paper examines a class of welfare subjectivism that addresses this dilemma with sensitivity to the diversity in welfare subjects. First, (...)
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  7.  34
    May an Artist’s Moral Ill Repute Affect the Meaning of Their Work? An Analysis from the Perspective of Speech Act Theory.Tomas Koblizek - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):1-19.
    The ethical criticism of art has recently begun to address the subject of immoral artists, with two questions seeming to dominate discussion. How does moral misconduct on the part of artists affect their work’s aesthetic value? How should the art world respond to cases of artists who have been accused of morally outrageous behaviour? Such value and policy debates are important, but they leave aside a pressing question towards which this article proposes a reorientation: What is the possible impact of (...)
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  8. Racist Monuments: The Beauty is the Beast.Ten-Herng Lai - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):21-41.
    While much has been said about what ought to be done about the statues and monuments of racist, colonial, and oppressive figures, a significantly undertheorised aspect of the debate is the aesthetics of commemorations. I believe that this philosophical oversight is rather unfortunate. I contend that taking the aesthetic value of commemorations seriously can help us a) better understand how and the extent to which objectionable commemorations are objectionable, b) properly formulate responses to aesthetic defences of objectionable commemorations, and c) (...)
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  9.  3
    Commemoration and Constriction.Chong-Ming Lim - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):43-62.
    In analysing the problems with commemorative artefacts, philosophers have tended to focus on objectionable monuments that honour inappropriate subjects. The problems with such monuments, however, do not exhaust problems with a society’s public commemorative landscape – the totality of public commemorative artefacts in general, and the institutions involved in their creation and maintenance. I argue that a public commemorative landscape can implicate authoritative ideas, including stereotypes about people in virtue of their group membership. This contributes to what I term hermeneutical (...)
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  10.  13
    Self-Defense Against Conditional Threats.Luciano Venezia & Eduardo Rivera-López - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics 29 (1):63-83.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that killing a Conditional Threat usually involves an unnecessary act of self-defense, so killing this aggressor is usually morally impermissible. We defend this thesis by showing that this case is fundamentally similar to a case involving an Unconditional Threat in which the victim can flee to safety although this involves incurring a minor cost. Second, we analyze the thresholds of maximal harm that victims are required to bear before they are (...)
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  11. The Moral Worth of Mixed Actions.Bowen Chan - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics:1-21.
    People often act from both motives that are good and motives that are not. How should we assess the moral worth or value of these actions from mixed motives? Having neglected these actions, the recent literature leaves us with no obvious answer. In this paper, I develop an answer. A mixed action, I argue, can be morally worthy even if it is done neither purely from good motives nor partly from good motives that suffice in some relevant sense to prompt (...)
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