This paper argues that the reason why political leadership often involves dirty hands is because of its relationship with violence. To make the case, it maintains that violent means create and assert a form of dominating power that is in tension with the proper ends of political action. This power casts a wide shadow, frequently dominating large numbers of non-targets and empowering unscrupulous agents. On the other side of the balance, characteristically political justifications for violence are ‘supra-moral,’ meaning that they (...) are motivated by the value of a conception of morality taken as a whole (or, indeed, morality as such) rather than by any particular moral value. The weight that ought to be given to such ends is indeterminate in a way that makes uncancelled remainders arising from the evil of violence likely in many cases. (shrink)

Commenting on Michael Walzer’s essay, the author adopts a perspective that traces back to Machiavelli. In this view, ‘dirty hands’ is a true problem faced by politicians, not a philosophical fiction or a moral quandary resulting from wrong reasoning. ‘Dirty hands’ results from the collision of two spheres of human action -morality and politics- which entail different duties; it concerns actions which have extremely serious public consequences and therefore applies eminently to politicians and the public sphere. The author examines different (...) scenarios to elicit a clear view of the specificity of this problem, which is not analogous to the conventional issue of immorality in politics. ‘Dirty hands’ is a problem that cannot be avoided by politicians, because they have responsibility over the ultimate decisions; it follows that people who wish not to dirty their hands should thus refrain from entering the political realm. (shrink)

A number of recent authors have argued for the problem of ‘democratic dirty hands’. At least within a democracy, public officers can be rightly said to act in the name of the public; and thus, as agents to principals, the dirty hands of public officers are, ultimately attributable to that public. Even more troubling, so the argument goes, since dirty hands are necessary for public officers in any stable political order, then such democratic dirty hands are necessary for any stable (...) democracy. Our dirt is the unavoidable cost of democratic survival.In this paper, I offer an argument against this disconcerting conclusion. My central claim is that proponents of ‘democratic dirty hands’ have missed the import of another feature of contemporary governance: public institutions. Public institutions, as organisational agents, intermediate the relationship between public officer and public; and in so doing, the dirt necessary for stability may be ‘laundered’: the public may still gain the benefit of a public officer’s hands, but remain clean of the dirt. I illustrate this case by an extended discussion of the case of La Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (‘CICIG’). (shrink)

This chapter introduces the Special Issue and offers an overview of the corpus of work on the topic since the publication of Michael Walzer’s seminal article, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’.

Moral dilemmas are a feature of moral life that make us vulnerable to tragic failures. But while all moral dilemmas involve unavoidable moral failure and leave a moral remainder, they do not all involve dirty hands. Recognizing that Thomas Nagel’s ideas about the availability of both agent-relative and agent-neutral perspectives from which to ask moral questions formed the backdrop to Michael Walzer’s work on dirty hands fifty years ago, this paper tries to explain why, when we must take both perspectives—thus (...) being an agent who meanwhile considers overriding the responsibilities of our particular agency—we risk dirtying our hands. The answer to a question about what ought to happen (as judged from an agent-neutral perspective) and the answer to a question about what one ought to do (as judged from an agent-relative perspective) are utterly incomparable because they are answers to two different questions, making any all-things-considered decision, when these answers conflict, unintelligible. If we decide to act on an agent-neutral reason to violate a conflicting agent-relative requirement, then despite our not having clearly made a wrong decision, our chosen action may be unthinkable. It is with the dirt of acting as an administrator of what ought to happen—as a kind of non-agent, when agency is urgently called for—that we do the unthinkable. The paper concludes that this combination of unintelligibility and unthinkability, when brought on by being an agent who steps outside of our own agency, is the mark of a dirty hands dilemma. (shrink)

This paper revisits many of the key ideas I explored in my earlier 1973 article “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”. I respond to some of the criticisms made over the last 50 years and emphasis certain key ideas that I believe are central to understanding this particular difficult problem for politicians.

Michael Walzer’s foundational essay on dirty hands raises the very possibility of a good person in politics. Dilemmas in the context of high stakes situations sometimes require politicians to compromise their morality and character for the sake of the greater good by choosing the lesser evil. Much has been written about dirty hands, but little has been said about Walzer’s implicit virtue ethics. This essay sketches this implicit virtue ethics, which is central to Walzer’s argument. These are “dirty” virtues, however, (...) that allow one to choose the lesser evil in a dilemma while recognizing that, although evil was mitigated, and some degree of good achieved, wrong done is still wrong done. For this to work, Walzer argues the politician must be and feel guilty, making this an odd virtue ethics that requires a degree of suffering from the politician. The essay further develops this notion of dirty virtue through comparison with Lisa Tessman’s “burdened virtue,” arguing at the end that the guilt and instrumental suffering, which are so central to Walzer’s virtue ethic, may be more corrosive to practical reasoning and character than Walzer allows for. (shrink)

This paper aims to square our considered judgements about the moral significance of healthcare with various empirical and conceptual challenges about its role in a theory of justice. I do so by defending the moral significance of healthcare by reference to a central but neglected dimension – healthcare’s expressive function. Over and above its influence on health outcomes and other metrics of justice (such as opportunity or welfare), and despite its relatively limited impact on population health outcomes, healthcare expresses respect (...) for individuals in a distinctive and morally salient way. Grounding the moral significance of healthcare in this way not only highlights an important distinguishing feature of healthcare, but it also makes our support for healthcare immune from several powerful objections against its significance. This conclusion has important implications for theorists of (health) justice and for political philosophers more widely, highlighting the appropriate role of healthcare within public policy and normative theorising about theories of justice. (shrink)

The meritocratic principle of educational justice maintains that it is unfair that individuals with similar ability who invest equal effort, have unequal educational prospects. In this paper I argue that the conception of ability that meritocracy assumes, namely as an innate trait, is critically flawed. Absent a coherent conception of ability, meritocracy loses its ability to morally evaluate educational practices and policies, rendering it an unworkable principle of educational justice. Replacing innate ability with an alternative conception of ability is, therefore, (...) crucial for meritocratic educational justice. I propose incorporating an alternative conception of ability into meritocracy—as the ″current limits of student ability″. The account of meritocracy that follows entails that unequal educational prospects are fair only when they result from the constraints of individual potential (or from differential effort). I argue that this potential-based account of meritocracy, though demanding, is a plausible and attractive account of educational justice. (shrink)

According to the person-affecting view, the ethics of welfare should be cashed out in terms of how the individuals are affected. While the narrow version fails to solve the non-identity problem, the wide version is subject to the repugnant conclusion. A middle view promises to do better – the Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare (ICV). It modifies the narrow view by abstracting away from individuals’ identities to account for interpersonal gains and losses. The paper assesses ICV’s merits and flaws. ICV (...) solves the non-identity problem, avoids the repugnant conclusion, and seems to accommodate the person-affecting intuition. But it cuts too many things along the way: ICV obstructs the advantage of the wide view to account for all future individuals’ welfare, abandons the intuitions that underlie the narrow view, and even violates its own presuppositions by turning out to be merely pseudo person-affecting. (shrink)

A plausible view about the epistemic condition of blameworthiness holds the following. Reasonable Expectation (RE): S's state of ignorance excuses iff S could not have been reasonably expected to have corrected or avoided the ignorance. An important, yet underexplored issue for RE concerns cases where an agent had the capacities and opportunities to have corrected or avoided the state of ignorance yet failed to do because of the difficulty involved. When does the fact that it was difficult for the agent (...) to have corrected or avoided the ignorance make an expectation to have done so an unreasonable expectation? Addressing this question is important for understanding what RE implies for a broad range of interesting cases where non-ideal agents out in the real world are ignorant because of commonplace difficulties (e.g., cognitive biases, complexity of large bodies of evidence, and misinformation). Whether commonplace difficulties excuse is an interesting and important topic that a satisfactory account of the epistemic condition needs to address. This paper proposes and defends an irreducibly normative account of when difficulty precludes a reasonable expectation to know better. The paper then shows how this account can be used alongside empirical research to reveal what RE implies for important cases of ignorance had by real non-ideal agents. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is (...) more plausible than the Belief-Based View. Finally, we show how the Hybrid View generates a more plausible fit between the concept of privacy, and a (morally objectionable) violation of privacy. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is (...) more plausible than the Belief-Based View. Finally, we show how the Hybrid View generates a more plausible fit between the concept of privacy, and the concept of a (morally objectionable) violation of privacy. (shrink)

Despite efforts to make virtue-acquisition more accessible, neo-Aristotelian accounts of virtue currently exclude those who occasionally experience depressive episodes from potentially possessing moral virtue. This problem of accessibility is especially relevant given the increased prevalence of depression due to, e.g., the COVID19 pandemic. Through an interdisciplinary analysis, I argue that one’s ability to adequately recognise and respond to virtuous possibilities for action is impoverished during a depressive episode. This is illustrated through the depressed agent’s field of affordances: the collection of (...) possible actions an agent perceives. As moral virtues are conceptualised as stable dispositions, even a temporary yet significant decrease in moral competence excludes the agent from possessing the relevant virtue. To solve this problem of accessibility, I argue that, similar to Aristotle’s discussion of sleep, depressive episodes can be conceptualised as temporary states that cause one’s virtues to be inactive, rather than absent. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Michael Moore’s (1997), and other similar formulations of desert retributivism – viz., the theory that holds punishment to be justified because of the deserved suffering it imposes on guilty offenders – are epistemically problematic. The argument draws on John Dewey’s inchoate critique of retribution, and on Dewey’s more general contention that the justification of ethical judgments and principles proceeds ex post – viz., that it depends on the experiences elicited by acting on those judgments (...) and principles. Based on Dewey’s ex post take on justification, I more specifically argue that, given its commitment to moral naturalism and to coherentism, Moore’s version of desert retributivism is epistemically unwarranted. This is because we have evidentially grounded reasons to think that many of the retributive judgments that underlie the principle of retributive justice are not clearly supported ex post in the relevant, desert retributivist sense. (shrink)

This article presents a rule-utilitarian theory which lies much closer to the social contract tradition than most other forms of consequentialism do: calculated-rates rule preference utilitarianism. Being preference-utilitarian allows the theory to be grounded in instrumental rationality and the equality of agents, as opposed to teleological assumptions about impartial goodness. The calculated-rates approach, judging rules’ consequences by what would happen if they were accepted by whatever number of people is realistic rather than by what would happen if they were accepted (...) universally or by exactly 90% of the population, allows it to select rules based not just on their ability to give good advice to their followers but also on their ability to attract followers in the first place. The result is a theory that, although fully utilitarian and not at all pluralistic or intuitionist, nevertheless offers a principled justification for giving some weight to seemingly non-utilitarian considerations: Lockean natural rights, Kantian respect for autonomy, and Scanlonian distributive justice. (shrink)

George Sher’s recent book A Wild West of the Mind offers a sustained argument against moralism: the view that private mental states are not subject to the authority of moral obligation. In developing this argument, Sher first argues that leading normative theories cannot account for the wrongness of private mental states like beliefs, desires, or emotions. He then offers an argument that the countervailing value of moral freedom is itself a positive reason to reject moralism. Against Sher, I argue for (...) a form of weak moralism. To do this, I first argue that the value of moral freedom does not clearly trump other significant values. I then support this argument by arguing that valuing anything at all puts rational constraints of private mental states. And because we have reason to value objects of moral value, we therefore have reason to conform our mental lives to those constraints. (shrink)

One topic of growing interest in the debate on intergenerational justice is the duty to respect the freedom of future generations. One consideration in favor of such a duty is that the decisions of present generations will affect the range of decisions that will be available to future people. As a consequence, future generations’ freedom to direct their lives may be importantly restricted such that present generations can be seen as taking future people’s lives into their hands and disempowering them. (...) This article defends the idea that present generations have an obligation to sustain a certain threshold of freedom for members of present and future generations alike. It argues that we should regard sustainability policies as a way to redistribute freedom across members of different generations. It starts by explaining the centrality of social freedom to the way we conceive of moral persons, then explains how freedom can be understood as an object of redistribution. It then argues that by imposing some risks—such as that of resource depletion or destruction of the ecosystem—on future generations, present generations push future generations’ freedom below an acceptable threshold. The paper concludes with examples of how this focus on freedom can offer guidance in selecting and justifying sustainability policies—for example, measures for conserving biodiverse environments—even when it is not clear how they will directly contribute to the well-being of future persons. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Lockean proviso can be utilized as a relevant principle of justice for food security under global climate change. Since reducing GHG emissions is key to enhancing food security, we suggest a global food security scheme that systematically allots, among all people, access to GHG sinks in food systems impacted by global climate change. For consideration of the scheme, it is important to have a principle of justice. Furthermore, it should incorporate the value of fairness. A (...) relevant principle of climate justice for food security should meet the following criteria: (1) the parties concerned under the scheme are states; (2) fairness does not undermine the requirement that the basic needs of all people must be met; (3) when determining fair burdens, a fair distribution of the rights to use GHG sinks should be sensitive both to each state’s responsibility for its GHG emissions and to (4) each state’s effort to reduce such emissions. With them in mind, first, we argue that the Lockean proviso can provide legitimate guidance for each state. Second, the Lockean proviso reasonably enjoins that a state has a right to a food system that secures its citizens’ basic needs, and a duty to meet the basic needs of other people. Third, the Lockean proviso can be deployed as a principle of both global justice and intergenerational justice for food security. Finally, the Lockean proviso enables us to count the reduction of GHG emissions by each state as “the fruits of its labors”. (shrink)

This paper examines the role played by consumers in producing what Iris Marion Young calls structural injustice. Through their consumption of a commodity, consumers can contribute to injustice, often as a result of their ignorance toward the ethical footprint of the commodity in question. After establishing that consumers are routinely implicated in structural injustice (Section I), I defend Young’s scepticism towards attributing blame to those who contribute to injustice through acts of consumption, whether their contribution to injustice result from a (...) state of moral or factual ignorance (Sections II-IV). I then examine the action-guiding implications of Young’s work and introduce the concept of conspicuousness to narrow the vast range of possibilities for action (Section V). I also suggest a revision to Young’s derivation of the responsibility she ascribes to people for ameliorating injustice. (shrink)

I respond to George Sher's A Wild West of the Mind. Sher argues that the mind is a “morality-free zone.” I respond that some thoughts are too risky to think. As a result, there are some moral limits on our mental lives. But these moral limits need not be overly burdensome. Many somewhat risky thoughts are nonetheless permissible.

In this article, I provide a philosophical analysis of the nature and role of perceived identity threats in the genesis and maintenance of fanaticism. First, I offer a preliminary definition of fanaticism as the social identity-defining devotion to a sacred value that demands universal recognition and is complemented by a hostile antagonism toward people who dissent from one’s group’s values. The fanatic’s hostility toward dissent thereby takes the threefold form of outgroup hostility, ingroup hostility, and self-hostility. Second, I provide a (...) detailed analysis of the fears of fanaticism, arguing that each of the three aforementioned forms of hostile antagonism corresponds to one form of fear or anxiety: the fanatic’s fear of the outgroup, renegade members of the ingroup, and problematic aspects of themselves. In each of these three forms of fear, the fanatic experiences both their sacred values and their individual and social identity as being threatened. Finally, I turn to a fourth form of fear or anxiety connected to fanaticism, namely the fanatic’s anxiety of and flight from the existential condition of uncertainty itself, which, at least in some cases, ground the fanatic’s fearfulness. (shrink)

The question of the basis of human equality has recently gained increasing attention. However, much of the literature has focused on whether persons—understood as fully competent adults—have equal moral status, while relatively less attention has been devoted to the analysis of what grounds the equal moral status of those human beings who are not fully competent adults. This paper contributes to this debate by addressing the question of the equality of moral status between adults and children. Specifically, this paper has (...) three aims. First, it provides a conceptual map of this complex issue. Second, it argues that the challenges that have been raised against standard accounts of persons’ equal moral status are even more forceful when applied to the question of adults and children’s moral equality. Finally, it examines what a commitment to adults and children’s moral _inequality_ entails and what it does not, thereby showing that the justificatory role of the principle of moral equality is not as far-reaching as commonly assumed. (shrink)

If a child’s well-being is at risk of considerable harm within their own family, state institutions usually intervene. In severe cases, the parents’ right to rear is suspended. Cases of risk assessment and potential state intervention are decided within a conflict between parents’ rights and claims of children for protection. There is, we argue, a standard model of normative assessment underlying these decisions: It rests on premises rooted in classic liberal political philosophy, which is prevalent in many Western societies, such (...) as a strong commitment to individualism, a separation of private and public, or a conceptualization of children as lacking the status of full right holders. We proceed in three steps. Based on cases in social work and child welfare offices, firstly, the article proposes an inductive approach to describe the problem. Second, we point out the most critical problems and shortcomings of the standard model. On this basis, third, we develop an alternative, pragmatistic perspective on child welfare and state intervention. It argues that child welfare must be understood more broadly as a societal concern than merely as a matter of the legitimacy of state intervention. A practice-oriented section follows to show what conclusions can be drawn from our alternative model. (shrink)

When we raise children what we are typically aiming for is a kind of flourishing; we want childrento live well as children, and to grow to become adults who live well too. Undoubtedly, part of what we are aiming forwhen we aim for a child’s flourishing is that they meet their developmental milestones well, and that they succeedamong their peers. We are also generally interested in how a child regards themselves; we want children tobelieve that they have value, and that (...) what they care about has value too. We also typically want children to havean appreciation for their relative value among others; that they are important among many other important beings,and we want them to act well in that knowledge. Of course, not all persons who raise children aim for those ends.Some do not care for how a child conceives of themselves, or whether the child flourishes at all. Others care fortheir children, and how they conceive of themselves, but aim poorly. As result, some children come to believe thatthey only deserve love and kindness when they succeed at meeting a caregiver’s ends. Some children come tobelieve that they have no worth at all. And yet other children, rather than believing they are unworthy, come toregard themselves as of superior worth; as children, for example, who bully and sneer at other children for being adifferent race, a different class, gender, ability, etc. may. When a child comes to understand themselves in theseterms, we typically see it at best as morally problematic, and at worst as a tragedy. Despite our interest inchildren’s self-conceptions, and the vast literature on how to conceive of and regard children, there is relatively littleregarding how children should conceive of and regard themselves. In order to explain how children shouldconceive of themselves it is my contention that a new account of self-respect is needed for the context of childhood;one that is responsive to the moral value of children, as well as their developmental capacities to recognize thatvalue. Given that developmental psychology is complex and subject to significant variation as children develop, myaim in this paper is to offer a snapshot of what I take self-respect to amount to in early childhood. In particular, Ifocus on an account fitting for children between three to six years of age. (shrink)

This introduction provides a brief overview of the field of childhood ethics. It briefly outlines current debates about children’s autonomy and vulnerability, children’s rights, the relationship between children and parents, and (social and global) justice for children.

This paper aims to answer the following question: what is the normative connection between paternalism and the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency? I consider the following two views. _The Robust View_ says that paternalism is _pro tanto_ wrong insofar as the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is always disrespectful. _The Less Robust View_ says that whenever the paternalist’s belief about the recipient’s agency is disrespectful, paternalism is _pro tanto_ wrong. I interpret the major motive-based theories of paternalism as (...) endorsing the Robust view. While this view is susceptible to a devastating criticism, I argue that the Less Robust view is true. To make my case, I elucidate three ways in which the paternalist may come to hold a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency. I then argue that any paternalistic action which is predicated on or motivated by a disrespectful belief about the recipient’s agency is _pro tanto_ wrong. Consequently, I suggest that motive-based theorists endorse the Less Robust view instead. (shrink)

When mature minors face a decision with important consequences, such as whether to undergo a risky but potentially life-saving medical procedure, who should decide? Relying on liberal political theory’s account of the importance of decisional autonomy for adults, and given the scalar nature of the capacities needed to exercise decisional autonomy, I argue that mature minors with the requisite capacities and commitments have a right to decisional autonomy though they are not yet 18. I argue for this right using a (...) ‘balancing of interest’ account of rights: the interest mature minors have in decisional autonomy outweighs their parents’ interest in shaping their children as a means of ‘creative self-extension’. But I propose two limitations on this right: requests for waivers of the rule that one must be at least 18 to decide cannot be so numerous as to make adjudication impractical; and though a competent adult’s voluntary decision to refuse medical treatment should generally be respected, the state may reject a mature minor’s decision upon review by an indifferent judge of the minor’s capacities and reasons. The judge reviews not the substantive merits or prudence of the decision, but whether the decision promotes the interest in decisional autonomy, by asking among other things whether the decision is the minor’s own, is tethered to core commitments rather than based on arbitrary preferences, and could be regarded as reasonable to the minor’s ‘future self’. (shrink)

Character realism is the view that many people have and act from character. This short paper attempts to articulate and draw attention to the underappreciated connection between our commonplaces about good friendship and character realism.