What If Barron and Klein Are Right About Insect Sentience?

Animal Sentience 115 (2016)
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Abstract

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

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Bob Fischer
Texas State University

Citations of this work

Animal Rights Pacifism.Blake Hereth - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4053-4082.
Categorical Desires and the Badness of Animal Death.Matt Bower & Bob Fischer - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (1):97-111.

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References found in this work

The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice.Peter Carruthers - 1992 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
What’s Wrong with Speciesism.Shelly Kagan - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):1-21.
Bugging the Strict Vegan.Bob Fischer - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (2):255-263.
The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice.Sandra Marshall - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):254-256.

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