Deflationary self-knowledge

In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--63 (1994)
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Abstract

As a number of philosophers have observed, our knowledge of what is passing through our own minds appears to be quite different to our knowledge of other things. I do not, it seems, need to accumulate evidence in order to know what psychological states I am in. 1 Without relying on evidence I am able to effortlessly attribute to myself beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, fears, and a host of other psychological states. The distinctive knowledge we have of our own psychological states is sometimes labeled privileged access. If ’privileged access’ means knowledge that is not evidentially based we certainly seem to have privileged access to some psychological states including those exhibiting intentionality.2 Nevertheless, some have questioned whether we do enjoy privileged access to our intentional states. One reason for doing so derives from the findings of psychologists. The time honored thesis that we have privileged access to our own psychological states is threatened by such findings (see especially Nesbitt and Wilson, 1977). Moreover, there is threat to privileged access from a different direction. It comes from a philosophical thesis commonly referred to as externalism. Externalism is the view that the content of an intentional state such as a belief is fixed by the environment external to the believer. Some externalists deny that externalism conflicts with privileged access. Donald Davidson and Tyler Bürge in particular have developed what might be called a minimalist account of privileged access which, they would claim, reconciles privileged access with externalism. An interesting feature of their account is that it suggests a defense of privileged access in the light of the psychological findings mentioned above. However, that is a topic for another paper. Here I will confine myself to assessing the Davidson Burge account of privileged access, and its implications for the relationship between privileged access and externalism.

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Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 15-54.

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