Abstract

One of the great problems of caregivers and health professionals in recent times has been the so-called compassion fatigue and its association with burnout syndrome. Another pole of compassion has been described in terms of compassion satisfaction. Both propositions could be problematic in the caregiving setting. This is an analytical reflective article that through an apparent aporia tries to problematize and propose a theoretical synthesis that allows to denote compassion as a virtue in Aristotelian terms. To this end, it resorts to etymologies, translations and mainly to the classical theoretical references regarding compassion fatigue, compassion satisfaction and, of course, Aristotelian ethics. This is a theoretical bet that leaves open the discussion regarding the dichotomies compassion fatigue and compassion satisfaction; apathy and hyperpathy; and proposes to rethink compassion as a virtue, a reasoned middle ground, contextualized in the framework of care between two possible excesses.