Grace and Reason: Freedom of the Will in Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes

Dissertation, University of California, Riverside (1998)
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Abstract

Rationalist philosopher Rene Descartes holds that a person chooses more freely the more her knowledge compels her will to choose one course of action over another. This conception of freedom is counter-intuitive; since we are inclined to believe that freedom involves alternate possibilities, it should strike us as odd that we might be more free the more our intellect compels us to act in one particular way. Such determination by reason would surely limit the number of options open to us; how could this intellectual compulsion count as freedom? In order to trace the origins of this Cartesian conception of freedom, I examine the philosophical works which had the greatest influence on Descartes, namely, those of Augustine and Aquinas. This investigation yields both a new reading of the medieval view of free will, and also a new way of understanding Descartes' thoughts on freedom. I argue that there are distinct grades of freedom implicit in the theories of Augustine and Aquinas, grades which neither Augustine and Aquinas themselves, nor any other commentators, have made explicit. These grades include the free choice of post-fall human beings, which is only the freedom to sin; free choice assisted by grace, which enables us to choose well; and the liberty enjoyed by the blessed in heaven, who are incapable of doing evil. I then show that Descartes' theory of free will is a rationalist adaptation of the gradational theory found in Augustine and Aquinas. Descartes' notion of `indifference' parallels the medievals' notion of free choice unassisted by grace; both represent our ability freely to err. Descartes' conception of `spontaneity' parallels the medievals' conception of free choice assisted by grace; the freedom enjoyed by a person whose acts are compelled by clear and distinct ideas is similar to that enjoyed by one who cooperates with grace , for each represents the freedom to choose well. Finally, Descartes agrees with the medievals in attributing perfect freedom to the blessed; because they conceive only true ideas, the blessed are incapable of judging or choosing poorly

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