Philosophy rehinged?

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This paper is devoted to the role hinge propositions play or should play in epistemology and meta-philosophy. It starts by distinguishing different ways in which propositions can be basic or fundamental and by arguing that the foundational status of hinge propositions cannot be reduced to any of the others. The second part maintains that hinges have anti-sceptical potential, provided that one combines Wittgenstein’s critique of sense with Moore’s method of differential certainty. The final part briefly considers implications of the idea of hinge propositions for two debates in which they have not featured so far—once concerning peer disagreement, the other the role of intuitions in philosophy.



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