Philosophy of Science 7 (1):56-68 (1940)
AbstractCharles Peirce was one of those rare individuals, an expert logician who is at the same time an experienced practical scientist. His logical acumen was apparent even to his contemporaries; while an early training in chemistry, astronomy, geodesy and optics, left him, as he declares, “saturated through and through with the spirit of the physical sciences.“ One is therefore hardly surprised to discover that he was deeply interested in scientific methodology—particularly in the logic of induction. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that some of his most significant contributions to philosophy were made in precisely this field. No apology is thus required for devoting attention to them. In the present paper I want to sketch his treatment of induction very briefly, and attempt a tentative estimate of its validity.
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Citations of this work
Eco and Peirce on Abduction.Francesco Bellucci - 2018 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 10 (1).
Neat, Swine, Sheep, and Deer: Mill and Peirce on Natural Kinds.Francesco Bellucci - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (5):911-932.
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