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  1. added 2019-02-11
    Well-Founded Belief and the Contingencies of Epistemic Location.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge, 2019.
    A growing number of philosophers are concerned with the epistemic status of culturally nurtured beliefs, beliefs found especially in domains of morals, politics, philosophy, and religion. Plausibly, worries about the deep impact of cultural contingencies on beliefs in these domains of controversial views is a question about well-foundedness: Does it defeat well-foundedness if the agent is rationally convinced that she would take her own reasons for belief as insufficiently well-founded, or would take her own belief as biased, had she been (...)
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  2. added 2019-02-01
    Covariance/Invariance: A Cognitive Heuristic in Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation.Andrea Cerroni - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (2):209-224.
    Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why (...)
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  3. added 2019-01-05
    Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment (Nicholas Maxwell) (Review). [REVIEW]William Peden - 2018 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 22 (44).
    Nicholas Maxwell is not afraid of big ideas. As the title suggests, this book covers several sweeping topics: aside from those in the title, Maxwell discusses the methodology of social science, interdisciplinarity, quantum mechanics, and more besides. Given the 325-page word-length, this scope inevitably means that the ideas and arguments are frequently underdeveloped. However, despite this proportion of pages to topics, Maxwell's book is clear, accessible, and (most importantly) thought-provoking.
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  4. added 2018-12-19
    Discussions: New Argument for Induction: Reply to Professor Popper.Roy Harrod - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):309-312.
  5. added 2018-12-15
    Reichenbach, Russell and the Metaphysics of Induction.Michael Shaffer - forthcoming - Argumenta.
    Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction in his later works on inductive inference was, and still is, of great interest. However, it has been dismissed as a pseudo-solution and it has been regarded as problematically obscure. This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. For entirely different reasons, the significance of Bertrand Russell’s classic (...)
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  6. added 2018-09-29
    Modeling Creative Abduction Bayesian Style.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla & Alexander Gebharter - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1).
    Schurz proposed a justification of creative abduction on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this paper we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination (...)
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  7. added 2018-09-29
    An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Symbolic Logic Volume 2: Informal Reasoning Assignments.Rebeka Ferreira & Anthony Ferrucci - 2018 - Open Educational Resource: OpenStax-CNX and Canvas Commons.
    This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-04
    Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures.Jan Sprenger & Jacob Stegenga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):840-852.
    Data from medical research are typically summarized with various types of outcome measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome measures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the reference class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second argument is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a decision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interpreted as measures of causal strength, absolute measures satisfy a set of desirable (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-22
    Induction and Natural Kinds.Howard Sankey - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (2):239-254.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, (...)
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  10. added 2018-05-18
    Experiment in Biology (2018 Update).Marcel Weber - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  11. added 2018-05-18
    Probability Judgements About Indicative Conditionals: An Erotetic Theory.Sam Carter - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (4).
    Research into the cognition of conditionals has predominantly focused on conditional reasoning, producing a range of theories which explain associated phenomena with considerable success. However, such theories have been less successful in accommodating experimental data concerning how agents assess the probability of indicative conditionals. Since an acceptable account of conditional reasoning should be compatible with evidence regarding how we evaluate conditionals’ likelihoods, this constitutes a failing of such theories. Section 1 introduces the most dominant established approach to conditional reasoning: mental (...)
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  12. added 2018-03-15
    Relational Coherence and Cumulative Reasoning.Charles B. Cross - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 109--127.
    I investigate the consequences of interpreting Lehrer's account of system-relative justification as a theory of inductive inference. I discuss which assumptions about coherence would be sufficient to make the account of inductive inference derived from Lehrer's theory conform to a series of widely discussed general principles, including those constitutive of cumulative reasoning. I then discuss the epistemological significance of the resulting theory of inductive inference.
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  13. added 2018-02-17
    Reason and Prediction.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - London: Cambridge University Press.
    An original study of the philosophical problems associated with inductive reasoning. Like most of the main questions in epistemology, the classical problem of induction arises from doubts about a mode of inference used to justify some of our most familiar and pervasive beliefs. The experience of each individual is limited and fragmentary, yet the scope of our beliefs is much wider; and it is the relation between belief and experience, in particular the belief that the future will in some respects (...)
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  14. added 2018-02-17
    Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):203-205.
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  15. added 2017-11-29
    Induction: Shadows and Light.Mark Andrews - manuscript
    Inductive conclusions rest upon the Uniformity Principle, that similar events lead to similar results. The principle derives from three fundamental axioms: Existence, that the observed object has an existence independent of the observer; Identity, that the objects observed, and the relationships between them, are what they are; and Continuity, that the objects observed, and the relationships between them, will continue unchanged absent a sufficient reason. Together, these axioms create a statement sufficiently precise to be falsified. -/- Simple enumeration of successful (...)
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  16. added 2017-07-27
    There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
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  17. added 2017-04-08
    Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?Peter Hawke - 2017 - In Bob Fischer Felipe Leon (ed.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. pp. 281-308.
    My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for (...)
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  18. added 2017-03-16
    Abductively Robust Inference.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):20-29.
    Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is widely criticized for being an unreliable form of ampliative inference – partly because the explanatory hypotheses we have considered at a given time may all be false, and partly because there is an asymmetry between the comparative judgment on which an IBE is based and the absolute verdict that IBE is meant to license. In this paper, I present a further reason to doubt the epistemic merits of IBE and argue that it motivates (...)
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  19. added 2017-02-19
    A Classic of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Metascience 26 (2):237-240.
    Book review of Paul Horwich, Probability and Evidence (Cambridge Philosophy Classics edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 147pp, £14.99 (paperback).
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  20. added 2017-01-04
    Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61:32-40.
    As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a form of ampliative inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it provides a better potential explanation of one’s evidence than any other available, competing explanatory hypothesis. Bas van Fraassen famously objected to IBE thus formulated that we may have no reason to think that any of the available, competing explanatory hypotheses are true. While revisionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection concede that IBE needs to be (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    Sober as a Judge.Gordon Belot - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):387-392.
    In Ockham's Razors: A User's Guide, Elliott Sober argues that parsimony considerations are epistemically relevant on the grounds that certain methods of model selection, such as the Akaike Information Criterion, exhibit good asymptotic behaviour and take the number of adjustable parameters in a model into account. I raise some worries about this form of argument.
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  22. added 2016-12-08
    The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning.Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson & Ziva Kunda - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):339-363.
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  23. added 2016-11-04
    An Abstract Model for Inductive Inference.Bernhard Lauth - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (1):87 - 120.
  24. added 2016-09-01
    Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-30
    The Semimeasure Property of Algorithmic Probability -- “Feature‘ or “Bug‘?Douglas Campbell - 2013 - In David L. Dowe (ed.), Algorithmic Probability and Friends. Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence: Papers From the Ray Solomonoff 85th Memorial Conference, Melbourne, Vic, Australia, November 30 -- December 2, 2011. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 79--90.
    An unknown process is generating a sequence of symbols, drawn from an alphabet, A. Given an initial segment of the sequence, how can one predict the next symbol? Ray Solomonoff’s theory of inductive reasoning rests on the idea that a useful estimate of a sequence’s true probability of being outputted by the unknown process is provided by its algorithmic probability (its probability of being outputted by a species of probabilistic Turing machine). However algorithmic probability is a “semimeasure”: i.e., the sum, (...)
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  26. added 2016-08-19
    Phenomenological Argumentative Structure.Gilbert Plumer - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (2):173-189.
    The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions--they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure--for legitimacy, and because these (...)
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  27. added 2016-08-18
    The Paradoxical Associated Conditional of Enthymemes.Gilbert Plumer - 2000 - In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8.
    Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...)
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  28. added 2016-08-18
    Necessary Assumptions.Gilbert Plumer - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1):41-61.
    In their book EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING Stephen Norris and Robert Ennis say: “Although it is tempting to think that certain [unstated] assumptions are logically necessary for an argument or position, they are not. So do not ask for them.” Numerous writers of introductory logic texts as well as various highly visible standardized tests (e.g., the LSAT and GRE) presume that the Norris/Ennis view is wrong; the presumption is that many arguments have (unstated) necessary assumptions and that readers and test takers (...)
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  29. added 2016-07-07
    Scientific Induction.Ray Scott Percival - 2006 - In Anthony Grayling, Andrew Pyle & Naomi Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopaedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes. pp. 1619-1622.
    A brief introduction to the debate about scientific induction.
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  30. added 2016-06-10
    The Domain Constraint on Analogy and Analogical Argument.William R. Brown - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (1).
    Domain constraint, the requirement that analogues be selected from "the same category," inheres in the popular saying "you can't compare apples and oranges" and the textbook principle "the greater the number of shared properties, the stronger the argument from analogy." I identify roles of domains in biological, linguistic, and legal analogy, supporting the account of law with a computer word search of judicial decisions. I argue that the category treatments within these disciplines cannot be exported to general informal logic, where (...)
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  31. added 2016-05-19
    Therapeutic Inferences for Individual Patients.Luis J. Flores - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):440-447.
    RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES: Increased awareness of the gap between controlled research and medical practice has raised concerns over whether the special attention of doctors to probability estimates from clinical trials really improves the care of individuals. Evidence-based medicine has acknowledged that research results are not applicable to all kinds of patients, and consequently, has attempted to overcome this limitation by introducing improvements in the design and analysis of clinical trials. METHODS: A clinical case is used to highlight the premises (...)
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  32. added 2016-03-15
    Are Inductive Generalizations Quantifiable?John O. Nelson - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):59 - 65.
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  33. added 2016-02-25
    Discovering Relativity Beliefs: Towards a Socio-Cognitive Model for Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation.Andrea Cerroni - 2002 - Mind and Society 3 (1):93-109.
    The research on which the present paper makes a point in aimed at designing a cognitive model of Albert Einstein's discovery that is based on fundamental Einstein's publications and placed, ideally, at a meso-level, between macro-historical and micro-cognitive reconstructions (e.g. protocol analysis). As in a cognitive-historical analysis, we will trace some discovery heuristics in the construction of representations, that are on a continuum with those we employ in ordinary problem solving. Firstly, some theory-specific, reflexive heuristics—named orientative heuristics—are traced: inner perfection, (...)
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  34. added 2015-12-29
    Nondeductive Inference. [REVIEW]P. K. H. - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (3):546-546.
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  35. added 2015-12-01
    Support and Surprise: L. J. Cohen's View of Inductive Probability. [REVIEW]Isaac Levi - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):279-292.
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  36. added 2015-11-13
    An Essay on the Ancient Ideal of ‘Enraonar’.Enric Trillas & María G. Navarro - 2015 - Archives of Philosophy and History of Soft Computing (I):1-28.
    ‘Reasoning’ can be considered a general concept that, upon speaking, is the ‘enraonar’, a Catalan word that should not be mistaken with ‘explain’ nor with ‘discuss’ which imply more detail, and cover different situations. This article is presented as an essay on the ancient ideal of ‘enraonar’. To that end, it is explained in what sense ‘enraonar’ and reason are one of the most complex phenomena thought has to deal with. Here it is argued that these natural phenomena require a (...)
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  37. added 2015-10-19
    The Collapse of Collective Defeat: Lessons From the Lottery Paradox.Kevin B. Korb - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:230-236.
    The Lottery Paradox has been thought to provide a reductio argument against probabilistic accounts of inductive inference. As a result, much work in artificial intelligence has concentrated on qualitative methods of inference, including default logics, which are intended to model some varieties of inductive inference. It has recently been shown that the paradox can be generated within qualitative default logics. However, John Pollock's qualitative system of defeasible inference, does avoid the Lottery Paradox by incorporating a rule designed specifically for that (...)
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  38. added 2015-08-31
    Statistical Learning Theory as a Framework for the Philosophy of Induction.Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni - manuscript
    Statistical Learning Theory (e.g., Hastie et al., 2001; Vapnik, 1998, 2000, 2006) is the basic theory behind contemporary machine learning and data-mining. We suggest that the theory provides an excellent framework for philosophical thinking about inductive inference.
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  39. added 2015-08-19
    Why Simpler Arguments Are Better.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):247-261.
    In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule.
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  40. added 2015-07-29
    A Logical Approach to Reasoning by Analogy.Todd R. Davies & Stuart J. Russell - 1987 - In John P. McDermott (ed.), Proceedings of the 10th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'87). Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. pp. 264-270.
    We analyze the logical form of the domain knowledge that grounds analogical inferences and generalizations from a single instance. The form of the assumptions which justify analogies is given schematically as the "determination rule", so called because it expresses the relation of one set of variables determining the values of another set. The determination relation is a logical generalization of the different types of dependency relations defined in database theory. Specifically, we define determination as a relation between schemata of first (...)
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  41. added 2015-07-28
    Analogy.Todd Davies - 1985 - In CSLI Informal Notes Series. Stanford, CA, USA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, No. IN-CSLI-85-4,.
    This essay (a revised version of my undergraduate honors thesis at Stanford) constructs a theory of analogy as it applies to argumentation and reasoning, especially as used in fields such as philosophy and law. The word analogy has been used in different senses, which the essay defines. The theory developed herein applies to analogia rationis, or analogical reasoning. Building on the framework of situation theory, a type of logical relation called determination is defined. This determination relation solves a puzzle about (...)
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  42. added 2015-05-08
    Wise Crowds, Clever Meta-Inductivists.Paul D. Thorn - 2015 - In Uskali Mäki, Stéphanie Ruphy, Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer. pp. 71-86.
    Formal and empirical work on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to the maintenance of ‘wise crowds’. In other words, com-munication and imitation among members of a group may have the negative effect of decreasing the aggregate wisdom of the group. In contrast, it is demonstrable that certain meta-inductive methods provide optimal means for predicting unknown events. Such meta-inductive methods are essentially imitative, where the predictions of other agents are imitated to (...)
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  43. added 2015-05-08
    Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
    The applicability of Bayesian conditionalization in setting one’s posterior probability for a proposition, α, is limited to cases where the value of a corresponding prior probability, PPRI(α|∧E), is available, where ∧E represents one’s complete body of evidence. In order to extend probability updating to cases where the prior probabilities needed for Bayesian conditionalization are unavailable, I introduce an inference schema, defeasible conditionalization, which allows one to update one’s personal probability in a proposition by conditioning on a proposition that represents a (...)
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  44. added 2015-05-08
    Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (2):339-366.
    Meta-induction, in its various forms, is an imitative prediction method, where the prediction methods and the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those methods or agents have proven successful in the past. In past work, Schurz demonstrated the optimality of meta-induction as a method for predicting unknown events and quantities. However, much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to (...)
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  45. added 2015-04-07
    There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the Body.David Papineau - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 369-376.
    This paper argues that all apparently special forces characteristically reduce to a few fundamental physical forces which conserve energy and operate throughout nature. Consequently, there are probably no special mental forces originating from souls and acting upon bodies and brains in addition to the basic, energy-conserving physical forces. Moreover, physiological and biochemical research have failed to uncover any evidence of forces over and above the basic physical forces acting on living bodies. It is as if all organic processes can be (...)
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  46. added 2015-04-06
    Dissolution Into Death: The Mind’s Last Symptoms Indicate Annihilation.David Weisman - 2015 - In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 83-104.
    This paper looks at progressive neurological diseases showing brain decline correlated with the decline of consciousness, as well as the content of consciousness. For instance, a young man’s healthy and fully functional brain generated an intelligent and lovely self, but then an aggressive brain tumor grew deep within his brain. As the tumor grew, it rendered brain tissue dysfunction and direct effects followed. From focal destruction of brain tissue, an aphasia first results. What follows is the dissolution of a functional (...)
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  47. added 2015-04-06
    Inductive Inference and Unsolvability.Leonard M. Adleman & M. Blum - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):891-900.
    It is shown that many different problems have the same degree of unsolvability. Among these problems are: THE INDUCTIVE INFERENCE PROBLEM. Infer in the limit an index for a recursive function f presented as f(0), f(1), f(2),.... THE RECURSIVE INDEX PROBLEM. Decide in the limit if i is the index of a total recursive function. THE ZERO NONVARIANT PROBLEM. Decide in the limit if a recursive function f presented as f(0), f(1), f(2),... has value unequal to zero for infinitely many (...)
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  48. added 2014-12-20
    Falsifiable Implies Learnable.David Balduzzi - manuscript
    The paper demonstrates that falsifiability is fundamental to learning. We prove the following theorem for statistical learning and sequential prediction: If a theory is falsifiable then it is learnable -- i.e. admits a strategy that predicts optimally. An analogous result is shown for universal induction.
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  49. added 2014-12-08
    Explanatory Coherence and the Induction of Properties.Steven A. Sloman - 1997 - Thinking and Reasoning 3 (2):81 – 110.
    Statements that share an explanation tend to lend inductive support to one another. For example, being told that Many furniture movers have a hard time financing a house increases the judged probability that Secretaries have a hard time financing a house. In contrast, statements with different explanations reduce one another s judged probability. Being told that Many furniture movers have bad backs decreases the judged probability that Secretaries have bad backs. I pose two questions concerning such discounting effects. First, does (...)
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  50. added 2014-12-01
    Induction and Probability.Ned Hall & Alan Hájek - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. pp. 149-172.
    Arguably, Hume's greatest single contribution to contemporary philosophy of science has been the problem of induction (1739). Before attempting its statement, we need to spend a few words identifying the subject matter of this corner of epistemology. At a first pass, induction concerns ampliative inferences drawn on the basis of evidence (presumably, evidence acquired more or less directly from experience)—that is, inferences whose conclusions are not (validly) entailed by the premises. Philosophers have historically drawn further distinctions, often appropriating the term (...)
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