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  1. added 2020-05-25
    The Multiplicity of Explanation in Cognitive Science.Raoul Gervais - forthcoming - Foundations of Science:1-16.
    In this paper, I argue that explaining cognitive behavior can be achieved through what I call hybrid explanatory inferences: inferences that posit mechanisms, but also draw on observed regularities. Moreover, these inferences can be used to achieve unification, in the sense developed by Allen Newel in his work on cognitive architectures. Thus, it seems that explanatory pluralism and unification do not rule out each other in cognitive science, but rather that the former represents a way to achieve the latter.
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  2. added 2020-04-14
    The Material Theory of Induction and the Epistemology of Thought Experiments.Michael T. Stuart - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-13
    Modeling Creative Abduction Bayesian Style.Alexander Gebharter & Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-15.
    Schurz proposed a justification of creative abduction on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this paper we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-02
    Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox.Chenguang Lu - 2020 - Entropy 22 (4):384.
    After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on the (...)
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  5. added 2020-01-20
    Rhetoric, Induction, and the Free Speech Dilemma.Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (2):175-193.
  6. added 2020-01-20
    A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
    Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-20
    Category-Based Induction.Daniel N. Osherson, Edward E. Smith, Ormond Wilkie & Alejandro López - 1990 - Psychological Review 97 (2):185-200.
  8. added 2020-01-20
    Discovery Logics.Thomas Nickles - 1990 - Philosophica 45 (1):7-32.
  9. added 2020-01-20
    Discovery and Ampliative Inference.James Blachowicz - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):438-462.
    An inference to a new explanation may be both logically non-ampliative and epistemically ampliative. Included among the premises of the latter form is the explanadum--a unique premise which is capable of embodying what we do not know about the matter in question, as well as legitimate aspects of what we do know. This double status points to a resolution of the Meno paradox. Ampliative inference of this sort, it is argued, has much in common with Nickles' idea of discoverability and, (...)
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  10. added 2019-12-10
    Skeptical Symmetry: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Scientific Reasoning.Erik Nelson - 2015 - Gnosis 14 (2):14-19.
    Many philosophers have wrongly assumed that there is an asymmetry between the problem of induction and the logocentric predicament (the justification of deductive inferences). This paper will show that the demand for justification, for the very inferences that are required for justification, is deeply problematic. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I will argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. For Wittgenstein, two concepts are internally related if my understanding of one is predicated on my understanding of (...)
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  11. added 2019-12-05
    Privileged-Perspective Realism in the Quantum Multiverse.Nora Berenstain - forthcoming - In David Glick, George Darby & Anna Marmodoro (eds.), The Foundation of Reality: Fundamentality, Space, and Time. Oxford University Press.
    Privileged-perspective realism (PPR) is a version of metaphysical realism that takes certain irreducibly perspectival facts to be partly constitutive of reality. PPR asserts that there is a single metaphysically privileged standpoint from which these perspectival facts obtain. This chapter discusses several views that fall under the category of privileged-perspective realism. These include presentism, which is PPR about tensed facts, and non-multiverse interpretations of quantum mechanics, which the chapter argues, constitute PPR about world-indexed facts. Using the framework of the bird perspective (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-08
    Are Non-Accidental Regularities a Cosmic Coincidence? Revisiting a Central Threat to Humean Laws.Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Synthese:1-1.
    If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-28
    Speed-Optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence.Michael Nielsen & Eric Wofsey - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz030.
    A standard way to challenge convergence-based accounts of inductive success is to claim that they are too weak to constrain inductive inferences in the short run. We respond to such a challenge by answering some questions raised by Juhl (1994). When it comes to predicting limiting relative frequencies in the framework of Reichenbach, we show that speed-optimal convergence—a long-run success condition—induces dynamic coherence in the short run.
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  14. added 2019-05-21
    Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking.David Manley - 2019 - Toronto, ON, Canada: Tophat Monocle.
    This book is the result of rethinking the standard playbook for critical thinking courses, to include only the most useful skills from the toolkits of philosophy, cognitive psychology, and behavioral economics. -/- The text focuses on: -/- - a mindset that avoids systematic error, more than the ability to persuade others - the logic of probability and decisions, more than than the logic of deductive arguments - a unified treatment of evidence, covering statistical, causal, and best-explanation inferences -/- The unified (...)
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  15. added 2019-03-12
    You Will Respect My Authoritah!? A Reply to Botting.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Informal Logic 39 (1):106-122.
    In a paper and a reply to critics published in _Informal Logic_, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expert’s judgment that _p_ is the case as evidence for _p_. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that _p_ does not make it significantly more likely that _p_ is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance (...)
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  16. added 2019-03-07
    Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation: Likelihood and Antilikelihood Principles.Roberto Festa & Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):56-81.
    We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satisfying a strong antilikelihood condition. We conclude by hinting at some (...)
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  17. added 2019-02-28
    On Probability and Cosmology: Inference Beyond Data?Martin Sahlen - 2017 - In K. Chamcham, J. Silk, J. D. Barrow & S. Saunders (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology. Cambridge, UK:
    Modern scientific cosmology pushes the boundaries of knowledge and the knowable. This is prompting questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. A central issue is what defines a 'good' model. When addressing global properties of the Universe or its initial state this becomes a particularly pressing issue. How to assess the probability of the Universe as a whole is empirically ambiguous, since we can examine only part of a single realisation of the system under investigation: at some point, data will (...)
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  18. added 2019-02-11
    Well-Founded Belief and the Contingencies of Epistemic Location.Guy Axtell - 2020 - In Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge, 2019.
    A growing number of philosophers are concerned with the epistemic status of culturally nurtured beliefs, beliefs found especially in domains of morals, politics, philosophy, and religion. Plausibly, worries about the deep impact of cultural contingencies on beliefs in these domains of controversial views is a question about well-foundedness: Does it defeat well-foundedness if the agent is rationally convinced that she would take her own reasons for belief as insufficiently well-founded, or would take her own belief as biased, had she been (...)
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  19. added 2019-02-01
    Covariance/Invariance: A Cognitive Heuristic in Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation.Andrea Cerroni - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (2):209-224.
    Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why (...)
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  20. added 2018-12-19
    Discussions: New Argument for Induction: Reply to Professor Popper.Roy Harrod - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):309-312.
  21. added 2018-12-15
    Reichenbach, Russell and the Metaphysics of Induction.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Argumenta 8:161-181.
    Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction in his later works on inductive inference was, and still is, of great interest. However, it has been dismissed as a pseudo-solution and it has been regarded as problematically obscure. This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. For entirely different reasons, the significance of Bertrand Russell’s classic (...)
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  22. added 2018-09-29
    An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Symbolic Logic Volume 2: Informal Reasoning Assignments.Rebeka Ferreira & Anthony Ferrucci - 2018 - Open Educational Resource: OpenStax-CNX and Canvas Commons.
    This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...)
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  23. added 2018-07-04
    Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures.Jan Sprenger & Jacob Stegenga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):840-852.
    Data from medical research are typically summarized with various types of outcome measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome measures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the reference class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second argument is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a decision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interpreted as measures of causal strength, absolute measures satisfy a set of desirable (...)
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  24. added 2018-06-22
    Induction and Natural Kinds.Howard Sankey - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (2):239-254.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of things, (...)
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  25. added 2018-05-18
    Probability Judgements About Indicative Conditionals: An Erotetic Theory.Sam Carter - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (4).
    Research into the cognition of conditionals has predominantly focused on conditional reasoning, producing a range of theories which explain associated phenomena with considerable success. However, such theories have been less successful in accommodating experimental data concerning how agents assess the probability of indicative conditionals. Since an acceptable account of conditional reasoning should be compatible with evidence regarding how we evaluate conditionals’ likelihoods, this constitutes a failing of such theories. Section 1 introduces the most dominant established approach to conditional reasoning: mental (...)
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  26. added 2018-03-15
    Relational Coherence and Cumulative Reasoning.Charles B. Cross - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 109--127.
    I investigate the consequences of interpreting Lehrer's account of system-relative justification as a theory of inductive inference. I discuss which assumptions about coherence would be sufficient to make the account of inductive inference derived from Lehrer's theory conform to a series of widely discussed general principles, including those constitutive of cumulative reasoning. I then discuss the epistemological significance of the resulting theory of inductive inference.
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  27. added 2018-02-17
    Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):203-205.
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  28. added 2018-02-17
    Reason and Prediction.Simon Blackburn - 1973 - London: Cambridge University Press.
    An original study of the philosophical problems associated with inductive reasoning. Like most of the main questions in epistemology, the classical problem of induction arises from doubts about a mode of inference used to justify some of our most familiar and pervasive beliefs. The experience of each individual is limited and fragmentary, yet the scope of our beliefs is much wider; and it is the relation between belief and experience, in particular the belief that the future will in some respects (...)
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  29. added 2017-11-29
    Induction: Shadows and Light.Mark Andrews - manuscript
    Inductive conclusions rest upon the Uniformity Principle, that similar events lead to similar results. The principle derives from three fundamental axioms: Existence, that the observed object has an existence independent of the observer; Identity, that the objects observed, and the relationships between them, are what they are; and Continuity, that the objects observed, and the relationships between them, will continue unchanged absent a sufficient reason. Together, these axioms create a statement sufficiently precise to be falsified. -/- Simple enumeration of successful (...)
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  30. added 2017-07-27
    There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
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  31. added 2017-04-08
    Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?Peter Hawke - 2017 - In Bob Fischer Felipe Leon (ed.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. pp. 281-308.
    My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for (...)
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  32. added 2017-03-16
    Abductively Robust Inference.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):20-29.
    Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is widely criticized for being an unreliable form of ampliative inference – partly because the explanatory hypotheses we have considered at a given time may all be false, and partly because there is an asymmetry between the comparative judgment on which an IBE is based and the absolute verdict that IBE is meant to license. In this paper, I present a further reason to doubt the epistemic merits of IBE and argue that it motivates (...)
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  33. added 2017-02-19
    A Classic of Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Paul Horwich: Probability and Evidence . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 147pp, £14.99 PB. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Metascience 26 (2):237-240.
    Book review of Paul Horwich, Probability and Evidence (Cambridge Philosophy Classics edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 147pp, £14.99 (paperback).
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  34. added 2017-01-04
    Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61:32-40.
    As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a form of ampliative inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it provides a better potential explanation of one’s evidence than any other available, competing explanatory hypothesis. Bas van Fraassen famously objected to IBE thus formulated that we may have no reason to think that any of the available, competing explanatory hypotheses are true. While revisionary responses to the Bad Lot Objection concede that IBE needs to be (...)
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Sober as a Judge: Elliott Sober: Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 322pp, $29.99 , $99.99.Gordon Belot - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):387-392.
    In Ockham's Razors: A User's Guide, Elliott Sober argues that parsimony considerations are epistemically relevant on the grounds that certain methods of model selection, such as the Akaike Information Criterion, exhibit good asymptotic behaviour and take the number of adjustable parameters in a model into account. I raise some worries about this form of argument.
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  36. added 2016-12-08
    The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning.Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson & Ziva Kunda - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):339-363.
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  37. added 2016-11-04
    An Abstract Model for Inductive Inference.Bernhard Lauth - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (1):87 - 120.
  38. added 2016-09-01
    Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees (...)
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  39. added 2016-08-30
    The Semimeasure Property of Algorithmic Probability -- “Feature‘ or “Bug‘?Douglas Campbell - 2013 - In David L. Dowe (ed.), Algorithmic Probability and Friends: Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 79--90.
    An unknown process is generating a sequence of symbols, drawn from an alphabet, A. Given an initial segment of the sequence, how can one predict the next symbol? Ray Solomonoff’s theory of inductive reasoning rests on the idea that a useful estimate of a sequence’s true probability of being outputted by the unknown process is provided by its algorithmic probability (its probability of being outputted by a species of probabilistic Turing machine). However algorithmic probability is a “semimeasure”: i.e., the sum, (...)
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  40. added 2016-08-19
    Phenomenological Argumentative Structure.Gilbert Plumer - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (2):173-189.
    The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions--they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure--for legitimacy, and because these (...)
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  41. added 2016-08-18
    The Paradoxical Associated Conditional of Enthymemes.Gilbert Plumer - 2000 - In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8.
    Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...)
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  42. added 2016-08-18
    Necessary Assumptions.Gilbert Plumer - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1):41-61.
    In their book EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING Stephen Norris and Robert Ennis say: “Although it is tempting to think that certain [unstated] assumptions are logically necessary for an argument or position, they are not. So do not ask for them.” Numerous writers of introductory logic texts as well as various highly visible standardized tests (e.g., the LSAT and GRE) presume that the Norris/Ennis view is wrong; the presumption is that many arguments have (unstated) necessary assumptions and that readers and test takers (...)
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  43. added 2016-07-07
    Scientific Induction.Ray Scott Percival - 2006 - In Anthony Grayling, Andrew Pyle & Naomi Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopaedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes. pp. 1619-1622.
    A brief introduction to the debate about scientific induction.
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  44. added 2016-06-10
    The Domain Constraint on Analogy and Analogical Argument.William R. Brown - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (1).
    Domain constraint, the requirement that analogues be selected from "the same category," inheres in the popular saying "you can't compare apples and oranges" and the textbook principle "the greater the number of shared properties, the stronger the argument from analogy." I identify roles of domains in biological, linguistic, and legal analogy, supporting the account of law with a computer word search of judicial decisions. I argue that the category treatments within these disciplines cannot be exported to general informal logic, where (...)
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  45. added 2016-05-19
    Therapeutic Inferences for Individual Patients.Luis J. Flores - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):440-447.
    RATIONALE, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES: Increased awareness of the gap between controlled research and medical practice has raised concerns over whether the special attention of doctors to probability estimates from clinical trials really improves the care of individuals. Evidence-based medicine has acknowledged that research results are not applicable to all kinds of patients, and consequently, has attempted to overcome this limitation by introducing improvements in the design and analysis of clinical trials. METHODS: A clinical case is used to highlight the premises (...)
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  46. added 2016-03-15
    Are Inductive Generalizations Quantifiable?John O. Nelson - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):59 - 65.
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  47. added 2016-02-25
    Discovering Relativity Beliefs: Towards a Socio-Cognitive Model for Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation.Andrea Cerroni - 2002 - Mind and Society 3 (1):93-109.
    The research on which the present paper makes a point in aimed at designing a cognitive model of Albert Einstein's discovery that is based on fundamental Einstein's publications and placed, ideally, at a meso-level, between macro-historical and micro-cognitive reconstructions (e.g. protocol analysis). As in a cognitive-historical analysis, we will trace some discovery heuristics in the construction of representations, that are on a continuum with those we employ in ordinary problem solving. Firstly, some theory-specific, reflexive heuristics—named orientative heuristics—are traced: inner perfection, (...)
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  48. added 2015-12-29
    Nondeductive Inference. [REVIEW]P. K. H. - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (3):546-546.
    This book is a clear, concise, and conceptually unified treatment of various problems, both formal and philosophical, of inductive logic and probability. Ackermann's main concern throughout the book is the problem of adducing inductive support for various hypotheses, and of deciding between two competing hypotheses which is more reasonable given the available evidence. The author begins with a general consideration of the criteria to be met by satisfactory rules of inductive inference: accordance with intuitive notions of reasonableness in simple cases, (...)
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  49. added 2015-12-01
    Support and Surprise: L. J. Cohen's View of Inductive Probability. [REVIEW]Isaac Levi - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):279-292.
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  50. added 2015-11-13
    An Essay on the Ancient Ideal of ‘Enraonar’.Enric Trillas & María G. Navarro - 2015 - Archives of Philosophy and History of Soft Computing (I):1-28.
    ‘Reasoning’ can be considered a general concept that, upon speaking, is the ‘enraonar’, a Catalan word that should not be mistaken with ‘explain’ nor with ‘discuss’ which imply more detail, and cover different situations. This article is presented as an essay on the ancient ideal of ‘enraonar’. To that end, it is explained in what sense ‘enraonar’ and reason are one of the most complex phenomena thought has to deal with. Here it is argued that these natural phenomena require a (...)
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