Analyticity, indeterminacy and semantic theory: Some comments on “the Domino theory”

Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):41 - 49 (1990)
Abstract
In "The Domino Theory" Professor Katz's general thesis is that the arguments against intensionalism advanced in the last four decades are arranged like so many dominos, since they all rest upon Quine's arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". If this is the case, then they are all vitiated if Quine's original arguments are unsatisfactory, and fall like so many dominos. I propose to accept, if only for the sake of argument, that all the other critiques of intensionalism which Katz mentions do ultimately depend upon the acceptance of Quine's original strictures, although I will express some doubt about this in the case of the indeterminacy of translation thesis. In this paper I will concentrate on Katz's argument against the first Quinian domino.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00374485
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