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Gila Sher
University of California, San Diego
  1.  29
    The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint.Gila Sher - 1991 - MIT Press.
    The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her (...)
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  2.  82
    Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
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  3.  16
    Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic.Gila Sher - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):150.
  4.  75
    In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth.Gila Sher - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):5 - 36.
  5. Invariance and Necessity.Gila Sher - 2019 - In Bernhard Ritter, Paul Weingartner & Gabriele M. Mras (eds.), Philosophy of logic and Mathematics. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 55-70.
    Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology.
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  6.  75
    Did Tarski Commit "Tarski's Fallacy"?Gila Sher - 1996 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (2):653-686.
  7.  83
    Truth as Composite Correspondence.Gila Sher - 2015 - In Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 191-210.
    The problem that motivates me arises from a constellation of factors pulling in different, sometimes opposing directions. Simplifying, they are: (1) The complexity of the world; (2) Humans’ ambitious project of theoretical knowledge of the world; (3) The severe limitations of humans’ cognitive capacities; (4) The considerable intricacy of humans’ cognitive capacities . Given these circumstances, the question arises whether a serious notion of truth is applicable to human theories of the world. In particular, I am interested in the questions: (...)
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  8. The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint.Gila Sher - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):1078-1083.
     
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  9.  70
    The Foundational Problem of Logic.Gila Sher - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (2):145-198.
    The construction of a systematic philosophical foundation for logic is a notoriously difficult problem. In Part One I suggest that the problem is in large part methodological, having to do with the common philosophical conception of “providing a foundation”. I offer an alternative to the common methodology which combines a strong foundational requirement with the use of non-traditional, holistic tools to achieve this result. In Part Two I delineate an outline of a foundation for logic, employing the new methodology. The (...)
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  10.  52
    Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route From Thought to Reality.Gila Sher - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 157--179.
    The paper delineates a new approach to truth that falls under the category of “Pluralism within the bounds of correspondence”, and illustrates it with respect to mathematical truth. Mathematical truth, like all other truths, is based on correspondence, but the route of mathematical correspondence differs from other routes of correspondence in (i) connecting mathematical truths to a special aspect of reality, namely, its formal aspect, and (ii) doing so in a complex, indirect way, rather than in a simple and direct (...)
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  11. Substantivism About Truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.
    Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist–deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect (...)
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  12. On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth.Gila Sher - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):133-172.
    The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief (...)
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  13. Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and A New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher BY Chen Bo.Gila Sher & Chen Bo - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):3-57.
    Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model of knowledge. (...)
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  14. Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?Gila Sher - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):353 - 365.
    The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?
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  15.  81
    Tarski's Thesis.Gila Sher - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 300--339.
  16.  52
    Functional Pluralism.Gila Sher - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):311-330.
    This is a critique of Michael P. Lynch’s functional pluralism with respect to truth. The paper is sympathetic to Lynch’s overall approach to truth, but is critical of (i) his platitudinous characterization of the general principles of truth, (ii) his excessive pluralism with respect to the “realizers” of truth, (iii) his treatment of atomic truth, and (iv) his analysis of “mixed” logical inferences. The paper concludes with a proposal for a functional pluralism that puts greater emphasis on the unity of (...)
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  17.  66
    Invariance and Logicality in Perspective.Gila Sher - forthcoming - In Gil Sagi & Jack Woods (eds.), The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning. Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press.
    Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a purely mathematical interest, it has developed into a criterion of considerable linguistic and philosophical interest. In this paper I compare two different perspectives on this criterion. The first is the perspective of natural language. Here, the invariance criterion is measured by its success in capturing our linguistic intuitions about logicality and explaining our logical behavior in natural-linguistic settings. The second perspective is more theoretical. Here, the invariance criterion (...)
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  18.  76
    Ways of Branching Quantifers.Gila Sher - 1990 - Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (4):393 - 422.
    Branching quantifiers were first introduced by L. Henkin in his 1959 paper ‘Some Remarks on Infmitely Long Formulas’. By ‘branching quantifiers’ Henkin meant a new, non-linearly structured quantiiier-prefix whose discovery was triggered by the problem of interpreting infinitistic formulas of a certain form} The branching (or partially-ordered) quantifier-prefix is, however, not essentially infinitistic, and the issues it raises have largely been discussed in the literature in the context of finitistic logic, as they will be here. Our discussion transcends, however, the (...)
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  19. On the Explanatory Power of Truth in Logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, strong modal force, generality, (...)
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  20. Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How Are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Study.Gila Sher - forthcoming - In Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter Studium.
    The viability of metaphysics as a field of knowledge has been challenged time and again. But in spite of the continuing tendency to dismiss metaphysics, there has been considerable progress in this field in the 20th- and 21st- centuries. One of the newest − though, in a sense, also oldest − frontiers of metaphysics is the grounding project. In this paper I raise a methodological challenge to the new grounding project and propose a constructive solution. Both the challenge and its (...)
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  21. Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts.Gila Sher & Cory Wright - 2007 - In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 280-306.
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms play in discourse. We (...)
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  22. Is Logic a Theory of the Obvious?Gila Sher - 1999 - European Review of Philosophy 4:207-238.
  23. A Characterization of Logical Constants is Possible.Gila Sher - 2003 - Theoria 18 (2):189-198.
    The paper argues that a philosophically informative and mathematically precise characterization is possible by (i) describing a particular proposal for such a characterization, (ii) showing that certain criticisms of this proposal are incorrect, and (iii) discussing the general issue of what a characterization of logical constants aims at achieving.
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  24. The Formal-Structural View Of Logical Consequence.Gila Sher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):241-261.
    This paper offers a response to William’s Hanson’s criticism of Sher’s formal-structural conception of logical consequence and logical constants.
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  25. The Model-Theoretic Argument: From Skepticism to a New Understanding.Gila Sher - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-225.
    In this paper I investigate Putnam’s model-theoretic argument from a transcendent standpoint, in spite of Putnam’s well-known objections to such a standpoint. This transcendence, however, requires ascent to something more like a Tarskian meta-level than what Putnam regards as a “God’s eye view”. Still, it is methodologically quite powerful, leading to a significant increase in our investigative tools. The result is a shift from Putnam’s skeptical conclusion to a new understanding of realism, truth, correspondence, knowledge, and theories, or certain aspects (...)
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  26. The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence.Gila Sher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):241-261.
    In a recent paper, “The Concept of Logical Consequence,” W. H. Hanson criticizes a formal-structural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski and Sher. Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view. Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says.
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  27. Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):151-176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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  28.  49
    Is There a Place for Philosophy in Quine’s Theory?Gila Sher - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):491-524.
    In the early part of the 20th century the logical positivists launched a powerful attack on traditional philosophy, rejecting the very idea of philosophy as a substantive discipline and replacing it with a practical, conventionalist, meta-theoretical view of philosophy. The positivist critique was based on a series of dichotomies: the analytic vs. the synthetic, the external vs. the internal, the apriori vs. the empirical, the meta-theoretical vs. the object- theoretical, the conventional vs. the factual. Quine's attack on the positivists' dichotomies (...)
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  29. Wallace, Free Choice, and Fatalism.Gila Sher - 2015 - In S. M. Cahn & M. Eckert (eds.), Freedom and the Self: Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. Columbia University Press. pp. 31-56.
    In this paper I reconstruct David Foster Wallace’s argument against fatalism in his undergraduate honors thesis, “Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’ and the Semantics of Physical Modality”. My goal is to present the argument in a clear and concise way, so that it is easy to see its main line of reasoning and potential power. A secondary goal is to offer clarificatory and critical notes on some of the issues at stake. The reconstruction reveals interesting connections between Wallace’s argument and John MacFarlane’s (...)
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  30.  77
    Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-306.
    Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. In this paper I turn the tables on this traditional conception of the relation between the two. The theorist of truth need not constrain his search for a “material” theory of truth, i.e., a theory of the philosophical nature of truth, by committing himself to one solution or another to the Liar Paradox. If he focuses on the nature of truth (leaving issues of formal (...)
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  31. Logical Consequence.Gila Sher - 1996 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan. pp. 310-312.
  32.  72
    Introduction and Commentary on Jennifer Hornsby's "Truth: The Identity Theory".Gila Sher - 2013 - Aristotelian Society 1:204-213.
    Jennifer Hornsby’s 1997 paper, ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’, has been highly influential in making the identity theory of truth a viable option in contemporary philosophy. In this introduction and commentary I focus on what distinguishes her theory and its methodology from the correspondence theory and the ‘substantivist’ methodology, and on other issues that have not been widely discussed in earlier commentaries yet are central to the current debate on truth.
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  33.  64
    Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition.Gila Sher - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):1-43.
    Following Henkin's discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or "cardinality" quantifiers, e.g., "most", "few", "finitely many", "exactly α", where α is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin definition first to a general (...)
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  34.  92
    Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  35.  89
    Lessons on Truth From Kant.Gila Sher - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):171-201.
    Kant is known for having said relatively little about truth in Critique of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from this work about truth, lessons that apply to the contemporary debate on the nature and structure of truth and its theory. In this paper I suggest two such lessons. The first lesson concerns the structure of a substantive theory of truth as contrasted with a deflationist theory; the second concerns the structure of a correspondence theory of (...)
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  36.  29
    Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology: Chakravartty, Anjan, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, Pp. Xviii + 274, £53.Gila Sher - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):618-621.
    Volume 97, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 618-621.
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  37.  73
    Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons.Gila Sher & Richard Tieszen (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of new essays offers a 'state-of-the-art' conspectus of major trends in the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. A distinguished group of philosophers addresses issues at the centre of contemporary debate: semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, the set/class distinction, foundations of set theory, mathematical intuition and many others. The volume includes Hilary Putnam's 1995 Alfred Tarski lectures, published here for the first time.
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  38.  10
    A Characterization of Logical Constants Is Possible.Gila Sher - 2003 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 18 (2):189-198.
    The paper argues that a philosophically informative and mathematically precise characterization is possible by describing a particular proposal for such a characterization, showing that certain criticisms of this proposal are incorrect, and discussing the general issue of what a characterization of logical constants aims at achieving.
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  39. Review of Stanley Peters and Dag Westerståhl: Quantifiers in Language and Logic[REVIEW]Gila Sher - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (2):103-112.
     
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  40. Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality.Gila Sher - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):195-219.
    In this paper I examine a cluster of concepts relevant to the methodology of truth theories: 'informative definition', 'recursive method', 'semantic structure', 'logical form', 'compositionality', etc. The interrelations between these concepts, I will try to show, are more intricate and multi-dimensional than commonly assumed.
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  41.  3
    Invariance and Necessity.Gila Sher - 2019 - In Gabriele M. Mras, Paul Weingartner & Bernhard Ritter (eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 55-70.
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  42.  11
    Is There a Place for Philosophy in Quine’s Theory?Gila Sher - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):491-524.
  43.  4
    A Characterization of Logical Constants Is Possible.Gila Sher - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 18 (2):189-198.
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  44. Semantics and Logic.Gila Sher - 1996 - In S. Lappin (ed.), The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Blackwell. pp. 509-535.
     
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  45.  48
    Johannes L. Brandl and Peter Sullivan (Eds) New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett.Gila Sher - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):185-189.
  46.  51
    A Conception of Tarskian Logic.Gila Sher - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (4):341-368.
    In this paper I develop a new conception of Tarskian logic based on Tarski’s intuitive characterization of logical consequence as formal and necessary in his 1936 paper. Special emphasis is placed on the role of logic in our system of knowledge, the origins of semantics, the semantic definition of logical consequence, and the role of logical and non-logical terms in a logical system. The paper offers a new definition of logical terms based on the question: what division of terms into (...)
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  47. Generalized Logic: A Philosophical Perspective with Linguistic Applications.Gila Sher - 1989 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    The question motivating my investigation is: Are the basic philosophical principles underlying the "core" system of contemporary logic exhausted by the standard version? In particular, is the accepted narrow construal of the notion "logical term" justified? ;As a point of comparison I refer to systems of 1st-order logic with generalized quantifiers developed by mathematicians and linguists . Based on an analysis of the Tarskian conception of the role of logic I show that the standard division of terms into logical and (...)
     
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  48.  30
    Logical Consequence: An Epistemic Outlook.Gila Sher - 2002 - The Monist 85 (4):555-579.
    In this paper I present an outline of a model of knowledge that complements, and is complemented by, my the conception of logic delineated in The Bounds of Logic. The Bounds of Logic had as its goal a critical, systematic and constructive understanding of logic. As such it aimed at maximum neutrality vis-a-vis epistemic, metaphysical and meta-mathematical controversies. But a conception of logic does not exist in a vacuum. Eventually our goal is to produce an account of logic that answers (...)
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  49.  29
    Truth and Knowledge in Logic and Mathematics.Gila Sher - 2012 - The Logica Yearbook 2011:289-304.
    Logic and mathematics are abstract disciplines par excellence. What is the nature of truth and knowledge in these disciplines? In this paper I investigate the possibility of a new approach to this question. The underlying idea is that knowledge qua knowledge, including logical and mathematical knowledge, has a dual grounding in mind and reality, and the standard of truth applicable to all knowledge is a correspondence standard. This applies to logic and mathematics as much as to other disciplines; i.e., logical (...)
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  50.  24
    In Memoriam: Jaakko Hintikka.Gila Sher - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2337-2338.
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