Self-knowledge: Inference, perception and articulation

Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):39-48 (1990)
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Since the demise of "introspective psychology" in the early part of this century, psychologists have been highly skeptical of agent accounts of their psychological states. The conventional wisdom is that empirical studies such as those documented by Nisbett and Wilson and Nisbett and Ross have demonstrated that self-knowledge of beliefs, emotions, motives etc. is indirect and regularly inaccurate. Although for many years philosophers supported an essentially Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as direct and certain, in recent times many have joined the psychologists in arguing that self-knowledge is regularly inaccurate and unreliable. In fact some philosophers, perhaps in atonement for past epistemological sins, go one step further, arguing that self-knowledge may be and probably is universally false. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)



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John Greenwood
CUNY Graduate Center

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