Abstract

ABSTRACT I have argued that Nietzsche was influenced by Afrikan Spir's falsification thesis, according to which all empirical judgments are false because they attempt to impose the necessity, unity, and timelessness of thought upon the contingency, plurality, and successiveness of sensations. My reading has been challenged by Nadeem Hussain, who claims that it ignores Spir's phenomenalism. For the phenomenalist, true judgments about sensations are possible. I argue here that Hussain reads Spir as a phenomenalist only because he mistakenly concentrates on the first book of Spir's major work, Denken und Wirklichkeit, before Spir presented his argument for falsificationism. When the rest of Spir's work is considered, it is clear that Spir believes that even sensations cannot be thought without falsity. I end with a brief discussion of the consequences of my argument for understanding Nietzsche.