Abstract

In my dissertation I explore the relationship between the concepts of history and rationality in political philosophy, particularly as they are developed in the work of Jurgen Habermas. I argue that the problem of relativism that arises from an historical approach to justification in political philosophy can be mitigated by modifying Habermas' conception of rationality so that it has an historical rather than evolutionary basis. ;The dissertation consists of three sections. In the first section I discuss Habermas' early work, particularly Knowledge and Human Interests and attempt to show that the foundation for a theory of history is contained in two central notions in that work: the self-constitution of the human species and the idea of an emancipatory interest underlying our quest for knowledge. I then go on to assess the Habermas/Gadamer debate on the relative merits of hermeneutics and critical theory, particularly on the proper approach to tradition in political theory. ;In the second section I examine Habermas' attempts to construct a theory of social evolution. This section is more critical than the first and attempts to show that Habermas took a wrong turn in moving toward a theory of social evolution instead of developing a philosophy of history on the basis of the early work. ;In the third section I examine Habermas' arguments against the philosophy of history and find them faulty. I show that Habermas' reluctance to embrace a "narrative" model keeps him from developing a philosophy of history that will be of practical use for political theory. The overall argument then is to defend an historical conception of political rationality that is not susceptible to the standard relativist objections to historicism