Abstract

In my paper, I argue that Kant identifies a good will with an end in itself. I provide textual support for this interpretation from several of Kant’s works. I also reconstruct two arguments from the Groundwork to support this interpretation. First, because a good will is a negative end, i.e. one that limits the kind of subjective ends that can be adopted, it is the right logical type of end to be identified with an end in itself. Second, Kant claims both that a good will is the only thing that has absolute worth and that an end in itself has absolute worth. The focus of my paper is to defend this interpretation from the objection that it has morally repugnant consequences. Commentators including Henry Allison argue that if Kant identifies a good will with an end in itself then only rational beings that possess a good will must be treated as ends in themselves and never as mere means. I agree with Allison that Kant could not have intended to exclude the many rational beings lacking a good will from the fullest sort of moral consideration. I disagree with Allison that the good will interpretation has this consequence. I argue that Allison’s objection can be met by attending to a distinction Kant makes between two kinds of ends in themselves. I claim that Kant identifies a good will with an actual end in itself. This kind of end has absolute worth and the status of an end in itself. I claim that Kant identifies all rational beings as practical ends in themselves. This kind of end does not have absolute worth or the status of an end in itself but must be treated as if it did. I draw a detailed analogy between Kant’s argument for the formula of humanity as an end in itself and his argument that rational beings are practically free to demonstrate that Kant makes this distinction. I claim that just as rational beings are practically rather than actually free in virtue of necessarily representing themselves as free, they are practically rather than actually ends in themselves in virtue of necessarily representing themselves as ends in themselves. Furthermore, just as rational beings are bound by the laws of freedom whether they are actually or practically free, they are bound by moral laws whether they are actually or practically ends in themselves. It follows that the moral law to treat others always as an end and never as mere means applies to all rational beings in virtue of necessarily representing themselves as ends in themselves, whether or not they have a good will and are actually ends in themselves. Thus, recognizing the distinction between two kinds of ends in themselves renders the good will interpretation of Kant compatible with the claim that all rational beings must be treated always as an end and never as mere means. KEYWORDS: Kant's practical ethics, good will, end in itself, freedom, humanity.