American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):301-21 (2000)
A few years ago philosophy of mind in the main English-language tradition was characterized by marked optimism about progress and by broad agreement that a correct theory would be a version of physicalism that admitted the sui generis nature of psychological descriptions and explanations. Now consensus seems to have given way to chaos supervenient physicalism has become so weak as to be virtually contentless and reductionism has become no more plausible than when it was generally rejected. The essay presses these points and suggests the need of more radical alternatives
|Keywords||Future History Metaphysics Mind Philosophy|
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