Year:

  1.  2
    Painfulness, Desire, and the Euthyphro Dilemma.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):239-250.
    The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  8
    Failure of Boredom: The Pendulum of Composition as Identity.Claudio Calosi - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):281-292.
    This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity and its semantical principles or it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  4
    Making a Contribution and Making a Difference.Neil McDonnell - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):303-312.
    There are at least two different concepts that philosophers might target when analyzing causation: a pre-selective notion and a selective notion. This paper argues that these two distinct conceptions have been conflated to date, citing the puzzles of overdetermination, extensionality, and transitivity as evidence. The primary aim of the paper is to help reset the methodological scene concerning analyses of causation.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  7
    Recent Work on Trust and Tesimony.Benjamin McMyler & Adebayo Ogungbure - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):217-230.
    Epistemologists have recently started appealing to the moral philosophy literature on interpersonal trust in order to help explain the epistemology of testimony. We argue that epistemologists who have given trust a significant role in their accounts of the epistemology of testimony have appealed to very different conceptions of the nature of trust, which have inevitably influenced the shape of their epistemological theorizing. Some have employed accounts of the nature of interpersonal trust according to which trust is a practical phenomenon subject (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  1
    In Defense of Medial Theories of Sound.Phillip John Meadows - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):293-302.
    In the recent literature on the nature of sound, there is an emerging consensus rejection of what might be thought of as the scientifically informed commonsense position: that sounds, whatever else they may be, must be entities that mediate between the source of the sound and the subject hearing it. This paper offers an argument for such "medial" theories of sound. This argument is intended to shift attention from the two considerations that have dominated the debate thus far: the relevant (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  1
    No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.
    One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action. To this effect, I introduce a distinction between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content; I argue that while it is plausible that norms of the latter type will govern action in general, epistemic norms will only govern actions characteristically associated (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  2
    Intention and Predicition in Means-End Reasoning.Stephen J. White - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):251-266.
    How, if at all, does one's intention to realize an end bear on the justification for taking the means to that end? Theories that allow that intending an end directly provides a reason to take the means are subject to a well-known "bootstrapping" objection. On the other hand, "anti-psychologistic" accounts—which seek to derive instrumental reasons directly from the reasons that support adopting the end itself—have unacceptable implications where an agent faces multiple rationally permissible options. An alternative, predictive, role for intention (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  13
    The Problem of Universal and the Asymmetry of Instantiation.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):189-202.
    Oliver's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's important interpretation of the problem of universals as one concerning truthmakers neglects something crucial: that there is a numerical identity between numerically distinct particulars. The problem of universals is rather how to resolve the apparent contradiction that the same things are both numerically distinct and numerically identical. Baxter's account of instantiation as partial identity resolves the apparent contradiction. A seeming objection to this account is that it appears to make instantiation symmetric, since partial identity is symmetric. Armstrong's (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  5
    Three Conceptions of the Logical Form of Exemplification.Valerio Buonomo - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):175-188.
    My aim in this paper is to discuss the logical form of exemplification. In order to achieve this goal, I analyze three views on the logical form of exemplification, namely, Gustav Bergmann's logical realism, Wilfrid Sellars's meta-linguistic expressivism, and Javier Cumpa's logical eliminativism. I start by examining the account advanced by Bergmann in his 1960 essay "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," according to which the logical form of exemplification is represented by the juxtaposition of logical signs in a sentence. Then I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  3
    Are Properties Particular, Universal, or Neither?Javier Cumpa - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):165-174.
    Are properties universal or particular? According to Universalism, properties are universals because there is a certain fundamental tie that makes properties capable of being shareable by more than one thing. On the opposing side, Particularism is the view that properties are particulars due to the existence of a fundamental tie that makes properties incapable of being shared. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the connections between the notions of the fundamental tie and universality and particularity. I argue, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  27
    Instantiation in Trope Theory.A. R. J. Fisher - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):153-164.
    The concept of instantiation is realized differently across a variety of metaphysical theories. A certain realization of the concept in a given theory depends on what roles are specified and associated with the concept and its corresponding term as well as what entities are suited to fill those roles. In this paper, the classic realization of the concept of instantiation in a one-category ontology of abstract particulars or tropes is articulated in a novel way and defended against unaddressed objections.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  9
    A Speculative Solution to the Instantiation and Structure Problems for Universals.Peter Forrest - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):141-152.
    Typical structural universals are not just the mereological sum of their constituents. Hence, there is the Structure Problem of explaining this non-mereological structure. The Instantiation Problem is that the predicate "U is instantiated by x, y, etc., in that order" is ill-suited to be a primitive, unanalyzed predicate. The proposed solution to these problems is based on the observation that if universal U is said to supervene upon universals V, W, etc., then it is the instantiation of U that supervenes (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  6
    Accidents Unmoored.John Heil - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):113-120.
    The essence of an accident consists in its relationship to a substance. For we should not imagine that an accident is a thing in its own right to which gets attached a relationship or a link to a substance in which that accident exists. For if so, an accident would be something in its own right, dependent on substance only as extrinsic, and on this view, an accident could be cognized apart from the substance. These outcomes are impossible, however. Hence, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  5
    Bergmann's Universal Realism: With and Without Fundamental Tie.Erwin Tegtmeier - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):121-130.
    Bergmann advocated a universal realism different from that of Plato. His universals are different, and the fundamental tie connecting universals to particulars is also in many respects different from Plato's participation. Since Bergmann takes universals to be perceptible, it makes sense to argue empirically for the existence of the fundamental tie of exemplification. He holds that exemplification ties universals and particulars together into facts. However, finally he drops fundamental ties and attributes to diads of diversity the togetherness of universals and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  2
    Resemblance, Exemplification, and Ontology.Paolo Valore - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):131-140.
    According to the quantificational Quinean model in meta-ontology, the question of ontology boils down to the question of whether a sortal property is exemplified. I address some complications that arise when we try to build a philosophical reconstruction of the link between individuals and kinds displayed in the exemplification relation from the point of view of conceptualism about kinds and having in mind this stand in ontology. I distinguish two notions of resemblance, object-to- object and object-to- kind, and show the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Odors, Objects and Olfaction.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):81-94.
    Olfaction represents odors, if it represents anything at all. Does olfaction also represent ordinary objects like cheese, fish and coffee-beans? Many think so. This paper argues that it does not. Instead, we should affirm an austere account of the intentional objects of olfaction: olfactory experience is about odors, not objects. Visuocentric thinking about olfaction has tempted some philosophers to say otherwise.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):63-79.
    The problem of stored beliefs is that of explaining how non-occurrent, seemingly justified beliefs are indeed justified. Internalism about epistemic justification, the view that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing, allegedly cannot solve this problem. This paper provides a solution. It asks: Does having a belief that p require having a special relation to a mental representation that p? If the answer is yes, then there are no stored beliefs, and so there is no problem. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  3
    The Transmission View of Testimony and the Problem of Conflicting Justification.Nick Leonard - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):27-36.
    According to the Transmission View of Testimony : TVT: If a speaker testifies to a hearer that p, and if the hearer is justified in believing that p on the basis of that speaker's testimony, then the hearer's belief is justified by whatever justification the speaker has for believing that p. The aim of this paper is to develop and defend a novel objection to the TVT.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  5
    Promises and the Backward Reach of Uptake.Hallie Liberto - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):15-26.
    I present a set of cases that pose problems for existing theories of promissory uptake. These cases involve a delayed receipt and/or acceptance of a promise, though the obligation arises before the receipt or acceptance has taken place; a delay or absence of agency on the part of the promisee—making it impossible to satisfy the various suggested uptake criteria, though promissory obligation is nonetheless generated; and the promise is made to someone, de dicto—that is, the person who will be the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  17
    The Threat From Manipulation Arguments.Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):37-50.
    Most seem to presume that what is threatening about manipulation arguments is the ‘no difference’ premise – that is, the claim that there are no responsibility-relevant differences between a manipulated agent and her merely causally determined counterpart. This presumption underlies three recent replies to manipulation arguments from Kearns (2012), King (2013), and Schlosser (2015). But these replies fail to appreciate the true threat from manipulation arguments – namely, the manipulation cases that are allegedly counterexamples to the leading compatibilist conditions on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  21
    Faith, Belief, and Control.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):95-109.
    In this paper, I solve a puzzle generated by three conflicting claims about the relationship between faith, belief, and control: according to the Identity Thesis, faith is a type of belief, and according to Fideistic Voluntarism, we sometimes have control over whether or not we have faith, but according to Doxastic Involuntarism, we never have control over what we believe. To solve the puzzle, I argue that the Identity Thesis is true, but that either or is false, depending on how (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  3
    In Defense of the Argument for Emotional Assent.Martin Smith - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):51-62.
    This paper defends the argument that the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions can only be explained by understanding emotions as yielding a distinctly nonjudgmental assent. The four premises of the argument are identified, and the three controversial premises are defended against recent rejoinders. Particular attention is given to defending the argument from theorists who advocate that perceptualist models either adequately explain the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions or show that recalcitrant emotions are not, in fact, irrational.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  10
    In Defense of Non-Causal Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):1-14.
    Non-Causal Libertarianism (NCL) is a libertarian position which aims to provide a non-causal account of action and freedom to do otherwise. NCL has been recently criticized from a number of quarters, notably from proponents of free will skepticism and agent-causation. The main complaint that has been voiced against NCL is that it does not provide a plausible account of an agent’s control over her action, and therefore, the account of free action it offers is inadequate. Some critics (mainly agent-causationists) have (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues