American Philosophical Quarterly

ISSNs: 0003-0481, 2152-1123

11 found

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  1.  21
    An Afro-Communitarian Relational Theory of AI'S Moral Status.Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues & Jiawei Xu - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):173-189.
    The rapid development of AI in recent years has brought the problem of AI's moral status to the fore. In this article, we combine Afro-communitarian ethics with a cognitive perspective and argue that some AI can hold a moral status to the extent that it can be both a subject and an object of communion. Further, different kinds of AI have different degrees of moral status, depending on their communal capacities. To demonstrate this, we show that AI can engage in (...)
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  2.  6
    Multi-Value Alignment for Ml/Ai Development Choices.Hetvi Jethwani & Anna C. F. Lewis - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):133-152.
    We outline a four-step process for ML/AI developers to align development choices with multiple values, by adapting a widely-utilized framework from bioethics: (1) identify the values that matter, (2) specify identified values, (3) find solution spaces that allow for maximal alignment with identified values, and 4) make hard choices if there are unresolvable trade-offs between the identified values. Key to this approach is identifying resolvable trade-offs between values (Step 3). We survey ML/AI methods that could be used to this end, (...)
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  3.  18
    Responsibly Engineering Control.Sebastian Köhler, Giulio Mecacci & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):113-132.
    A number of concerns have been recently raised regarding the possibility of human agents to effectively maintain control over intelligent and (partially) autonomous artificial systems. These issues have been deemed to raise “responsibility gaps.” To address these gaps, several scholars and other public and private stakeholders converged towards the idea that, in deploying intelligent technology, a meaningful form of human control (MHC) should be at all times exercised over autonomous intelligent technology. One of the main criticisms of the general idea (...)
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  4.  41
    No Wellbeing for Robots (and Hence no Rights).Peter Königs - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):191-208.
    A central question in AI ethics concerns the moral status of robots. This article argues against the idea that they have moral status. It proceeds by defending the assumption that consciousness is necessary for welfare subjectivity. Since robots most likely lack consciousness, and welfare subjectivity is necessary for moral status, it follows that robots lack moral status. The assumption that consciousness is necessary for welfare subjectivity appears to be in tension with certain widely accepted theories of wellbeing, especially versions of (...)
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  5.  26
    Towards A Skillful-Expert Model for Virtuous Machines.Felix S. H. Yeung & Fei Song - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):153-171.
    While most contemporary proposals of ethics for machines draw upon principle-based ethics, a number of recent studies attempt to build machines capable of acting virtuously. This paper discusses the promises and limitations of building virtue-ethical machines. Taking inspiration from various philosophical traditions—including Greek philosophy (Aristotle), Chinese philosophy (Zhuangzi), phenomenology (Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus) and contemporary virtue theory (Julia Annas)—we argue for a novel model of machine ethics we call the “skillful-expert model.” This model sharply distinguishes human virtues and their machine (...)
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  6. Reasons to Respond to AI Emotional Expressions.Rodrigo Díaz & Jonas Blatter - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):87-102.
    Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...)
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  7.  23
    Smoke Machines.Keith Raymond Harris - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):69-86.
    Emotive artificial intelligences are physically or virtually embodied entities whose behavior is driven by artificial intelligence, and which use expressions usually associated with emotion to enhance communication. These entities are sometimes thought to be deceptive, insofar as their emotive expressions are not connected to genuine underlying emotions. In this paper, I argue that such entities are indeed deceptive, at least given a sufficiently broad construal of deception. But, while philosophers and other commentators have drawn attention to the deceptive threat of (...)
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  8.  10
    Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent Concept.Patrik Hummel - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):53-68.
    In this article, I investigate whether algorithmic fairness is an inconsistent concept (the inconsistency thesis). Drawing on the work of Kevin Scharp, inconsistent concepts can apply and disapply at the same time (2.). It is shown that paradigmatic issues of algorithmic fairness fit this description (3.). Similarities and differences to received views (4.) and alternatives to the inconsistency thesis are considered (5.). Suggestions are articulated on how the inconsistency thesis might hold ground nevertheless, or at the very least denotes a (...)
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  9.  38
    A Capability Approach to AI Ethics.Emanuele Ratti & Mark Graves - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):1-16.
    We propose a conceptualization and implementation of AI ethics via the capability approach. We aim to show that conceptualizing AI ethics through the capability approach has two main advantages for AI ethics as a discipline. First, it helps clarify the ethical dimension of AI tools. Second, it provides guidance to implementing ethical considerations within the design of AI tools. We illustrate these advantages in the context of AI tools in medicine, by showing how ethics-based auditing of AI tools in medicine (...)
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  10.  19
    Healthcare Resource Allocation, Machine Learning, and Distributive Justice.Jamie Webb - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):33-52.
    The literature on the ethics of machine learning in healthcare contains a great deal of work on algorithmic fairness. But a focus on fairness has not been matched with sufficient attention to the relationship between machine learning and distributive justice in healthcare. A significant number of clinical prediction models have been developed which could be used to inform the allocation of scarce healthcare resources. As such, philosophical theories of distributive justice are relevant when considering the ethics of their design and (...)
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  11.  22
    Rethinking The Replacement of Physicians with AI.Hanhui Xu & Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth - 2025 - American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1):17-31.
    The application of AI in healthcare has dramatically changed the practice of medicine. In particular, AI has been implemented in a variety of roles that previously required human physicians. Due to AI's ability to outperform humans in these roles, the concern has been raised that AI will completely replace human physicians in the future. In this paper, it is argued that human physician's ability to embellish the truth is necessary to prevent injury or grief to patients, or to protect patients’ (...)
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