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  1. Does the Direct Argument Beg the Question?Justin Capes - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):81-96.
    The direct argument is among the most prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. Some critics of the argument have accused it, or certain defenses of its central premise, of begging the question. This article responds to that accusation.
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    Belief in Character Studies.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):27-42.
    In Go Set a Watchman, Harper Lee reveals that American man of integrity Atticus Finch harbors deep-seated racist beliefs. Bob Ewell, Finch's nemesis in To Kill a Mockingbird, harbors the same beliefs. But the two men live out their shared racist beliefs in dramatically different fashions. This article argues that extant dispositionalist accounts of belief lack the tools to accommodate Finch and Ewell's divergent styles of believing. It then draws on literary and philosophical character studies to construct the required tools.
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  3. Metaphysical Foundationalism: Consensus and Controversy.Thomas Oberle - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):97-110.
    There has been an explosion of interest in the metaphysics of fundamentality in recent decades. The consensus view, called metaphysical foundationalism, maintains that there is something absolutely fundamental in reality upon which everything else depends. However, a number of thinkers have chal- lenged the arguments in favor of foundationalism and have proposed competing non-foundationalist ontologies. This paper provides a systematic and critical introduction to metaphysical foundationalism in the current literature and argues that its relation to ontological dependence and substance should (...)
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    Closed-Minded Belief and Indoctrination.Christopher Ranalli - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):61-80.
    What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of closed-minded belief caused by “epistemically insulating content.” This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one's belief is reprehensible, whether morally or epistemically. As such, it does not demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent's rational evaluation. In this (...)
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  5. A Problem for Immanent Universals in States of Affairs.Michael J. Raven - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):1-9.
    This paper raises a problem for the pair of views that universals are immanent in their instantiations and that these instantiations, or states of affairs, are somehow constructed from the instantiated universals. It is argued that the pair is inconsistent. The first view implies that universals are prior to states of affairs, whereas the second view implies that states of affairs are prior to universals. This paper does not attempt to solve this problem, but rather to formulate it precisely. That (...)
     
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  6. Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem?Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (59):149-159.
    Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism. -/- This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional (...)
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