Beneficence, Numbers, and the Procreation Asymmetry

Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (6):597-619 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry, there are weighty reasons not to create miserable people and only weaker reasons to create happy people. This view has several advantages over the Strong Procreation Asymmetry, which holds that there are no reasons to create happy people. Nonetheless, it faces a serious problem: according to some critics, it suggests that our reasons to create lives are as strong as our reasons to save lives. In response, this essay draws on the intuition that we have reason to maximize the number of lives saved, even when doing so would not secure a greater benefit. Numbers are not comparably relevant, however, to choices involving the creation of people. Taken together, these judgments show that there is typically an “extra” consideration that favors saving lives over creating lives. They thereby help to defuse a common objection to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,779

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-02

Downloads
26 (#597,230)

6 months
6 (#701,066)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jason Hanna
Northern Illinois University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references