Kantian non-conceptualism

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64 (2008)
Abstract
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
Keywords Non-conceptual mental content  Spatial representation  Concepts  Consciousness  Kant
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.

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