Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility

Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science (2015)

Authors
Johannes Himmelreich
Stanford University
Abstract
We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is a causal one. I claim that responsibility requires causation and I develop a causal account of agency. This account is particularly apt for addressing the relationship between agency and moral responsibility and sheds light on the causal foundations of moral responsibility.
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
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