My philosophical position says

and I don't believe

In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Alan Hajek
Australian National University

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