A Presentist-Friendly Definition of “Endure”

Philosophia 48 (5):1837-1854 (2020)
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It is a commonplace that things persist, though thinkers disagree over what persistence consist in. Views about time are closely related to views about persistence, though some have questioned the compatibility of certain combinations, such as Jonathan Tallant’s recent argument that presentism is incompatible with all views of persistence, including endurantism. We believe that such arguments can be avoided with neutral definitions of the terms. However, a nearly exhaustive investigation of contemporary literature revealed that, except for two that we could find, all definitions of “persist,” “endure,” and derivatives are incompatible with presentism! And, the exceptions fail to capture endurantist intuitions about endurance. But we believe that present-friendly and intuitive definitions of these concepts can be given. In this paper we offer such definitions. We go on to apply our definitions to two sample cases, showing that if our neutral definitions are used, the arguments in the cases fail.



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Keith Hess
College of Southern Nevada

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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.

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