Semantic primitivism and normativity

Ratio 14 (1):1-17 (2001)
Kripke-Wittgenstein meaning skepticism appears as a serious threat to the idea that there could be meaning-constituting facts. Some people argue that the only viable response is to adopt semantic primitivism (SP). SP is the doctrine that meaning-facts are _sui generis and irreducibly semantic. The idea is that by allowing such primitive semantic facts into our ontology Kripke's skeptical paradox cannot arise. I argue that SP is untenable in spite of its apparent resourcefulness. (edited)
Keywords Epistemology  Normativity  Paradox  Primitivism  Semantics  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00141
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