Seeing-in and seeming to see

Analysis 72 (4):650-659 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When we see something in a picture, do we enjoy visual experience as of the depicted object? Gombrichians say yes: when viewing ordinary pictures we simultaneously see the picture and seem to see its object. But why, then, isn’t seeing-in contradictory, and how are these two elements somehow integrated into a single experience? Gombrichians’ attempts to answer appeal either to our awareness of the picture’s design, or to the idea that picture and object are not given as in the same place. I argue that neither answer is successful, and thus that Gombrichianism is false

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,960

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Seeing depicted space (or not).Mikael Pettersson - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Inflected and uninflected perception of pictures.Bence Nanay - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Infinity and Experience.Lisa Ann Sereno - 1999 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Pictures, presence and visibility.Solveig Aasen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):187-203.
Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 151.
Pictorial experience and seeing.Michael Newall - 2009 - British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (2):129-141.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-09-11

Downloads
221 (#117,368)

6 months
16 (#201,150)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Hopkins
New York University

Citations of this work

A Theory of Sense-Data.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
Threefoldness.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):163-182.
Trompe l’oeil and the Dorsal/Ventral Account of Picture Perception.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):181-197.
The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In.Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1285-1324.
Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2015 - In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. New York: Routledge. pp. 49-88.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination.Jean-Paul Sartre - 2004 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre.
Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 151.
Heavenly Sight and the Nature of Seeing-In.John Kulvicki - 2009 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (4):387-397.

Add more references