Inductive Logic

In J. Lachs R. Talisse (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge (2008)
Abstract
Logic is the study of the quality of arguments. An argument consists of a set of premises and a conclusion. The quality of an argument depends on at least two factors: the truth of the premises, and the strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion. The truth of the premises is a contingent factor that depends on the state of the world. The strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion is supposed to be independent of the state of the world. Logic is only concerned with this second, logical factor of the quality of arguments.
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