Abstract

The „Ontological Difference”, the central theme of Heidegger's thinking, is brought into language by him in many and in different ways. It does not have just one meaning, but it has different meanings. First of all there is a distinction between Being and beings. The distinction is not understood as a static difference, or as a certain relation between two entities which have a mutual relationship from the viewpoint of being distinct. Being „is” rather the event in which the distinct beings come about and can be distinguished. The beings in their mutually-being-distinct-and-belonging-together come about in an aboriginal ex-positing and assembling into unity. Now, Heidegger calls this very event Being, and as such the „Difference” and Being are the same. The „Difference”, or the event of ex-positing and assembling does not come about without thinking; on the other hand, however, thinking can-not be identified with it. Thinking is rather the place where the event takes place. Between thinking and Being there is also a difference. Being grants thinking, and thinking thinks only in as far as Being grants thinking. The „Difference” is, therefore, the event within which thinking thinks. In history there are many distinct periods. Thinking or the Being-comprehension of the Greeks, of the Middle-Ages and of modern times is always different, and consequently also the ways in which beings appear in every period of history. The distinct periods and consequently the periods which can be distinguished are distinct precisely by virtue of the „Difference”. Being itself is the event in which beings and thinking emerge from hidden-ness into un-concealment. Un-concealment is never completed, but remains always ad-vent. This implicates, furthermore, that no beings will ever coincide with Being itself and that thinking is never identical with Being. Being remains always different from thinking, it remains that which grants thinking and thinking remains always a receptive listening. The different periods of thinking also determine the different ways in which beings appear. Thus, in our period beings appear primarily either as objects or as subjects. The appearance itself as object or subject, however, remains hidden. When this hiddenness vanishes completely from re-collection, and thus beings are identified unconditionally with being-subject or -object, it constitutes a danger. Eventually this will end into nihilism. A fundamental problem, however, in Heidegger's philosophy could be expressed in the question: how can he bring into language the „Ontological Difference”, while this is still hidden in our period of history? Does not Heidegger thus lapse into a new Hegelianism? Heidegger's thought, however, differs from Hegel because of his affirmation that every thinking thinks within an original giving of Being itself. Being remains always ad-vent and thinking a receiving. Heidegger does affirm that also his own thinking was granted to him by Being. It may be wondered, if with this the fundamental difficulty which emerges from within his own thinking is solved sufficiently