Abstract

I defend the completeness thesis: that all the factors that the judge brings to bear on the adjudication of hard cases are a part of the legal system. I do this within the context of the Hart-Dworkin debate--because Hart denies and Dworkin affirms legal completeness--thus highlighting the problems with their accounts of the nature of a legal system with respect to adjudication. The problem of adjudication, which arises for easy any hard cases, is the justification for the judge's application of law in a certain manner; justification is presupposed in easy cases but explicitly stated in hard cases. ;The theories of Hart and Dworkin have ignored an important element in the nature of a legal system. This is the principles of practical reasonableness, which as the foundation for the legal system, accounts for legal validity and adjudication. Thus the questions of validity and adjudication are not mutually exclusive; they have a common foundation which justifies and explains the procedures of the legal system, and the contents of laws and decisions. ;Practical reasonableness is an internalist concept because it presents law as conclusive reasons for action in justifying and motivating the actions of every participant in the legal system. It constitutes the basis for the acceptance of the system, the making of laws, the decision of the judge and the obligation to obey laws. ;Practical reasonableness, I construe as a means-end schema, and an aspect of practical reason. It is distinguished from rationality in that as opposed to rationality, it entails morality. This stance is a kind of natural law theory because it affirms a 'necessary connection' between morality and the legal system, in that practical reasonableness is a necessary condition for the existence of a legal system. ;The principles of practical reasonableness as a constituent part of the legal system, the judge has to appeal to in hard cases when the statute offers no explicit guide, hence the system is complete. As a result, the judge does not use any extra-legal factors; hence she does not have strong discretion, and is neither unfair nor arbitrary