Abstract

One of the enduring contributions of Descartes to philosophy is Descartes’ response to the challenge of scepticism. In addressing the challenge of scepticism Descartes understood that scepticism was a philosophical challenge which needed to be answered by taking into account its inner logic. It is not surprising therefore that Descartes sought to demonstrate as a counter-point to scepticism that there is at least one truth we can know with certitude, namely, the truth of the self. By fulfilling the demand of indubitability the emergence of the truth of the self, as it were, signals certain victory for Descartes in his fight against scepticism. Yet so far as we cannot say that the truth of the cogito is objective unless God guarantees its objectivity, it remains to be seen whether Descartes’ victory over scepticism is conclusive. Consequently, while the discovery of the cogito represents a key moment in Descartes’ effort to contain scepticism so far as it furnishes him with an indubitable foundation, his effort to reconstruct the edifice of knowledge ends in failure so far as it witnesses a resurgence of scepticism in respect of our knowledge of the external world. The argument of this paper is that Descartes’ appeal to God as the guarantor of the objective certainty of the truth of the cogito grossly undermines the overall success of Descartes’ response to the challenge of scepticism.