Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation

Philosophical Studies 146 (2):159 - 177 (2009)
Abstract
While philosophers of language have traditionally relied upon their intuitions about cases when developing theories of reference, this methodology has recently been attacked on the grounds that intuitions about reference, far from being universal, show significant cultural variation, thus undermining their relevance for semantic theory. I’ll attempt to demonstrate that (1) such criticisms do not, in fact, undermine the traditional philosophical methodology, and (2) our underlying intuitions about the nature of reference may be more universal than the authors suppose.
Keywords Experimental philosophy  Language  Intuitions  Conceptual analysis
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9249-6
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reason, Truth, and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy.Max Deutsch - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
Theories of Reference and Experimental Philosophy.James Genone - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):152-163.

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