Abstract

What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social justice, we might be more inclined to say that cancel culture is morally good. However, one could argue that cancel culture has too harsh consequences or involves immoral – even hateful – behaviour. We propose that cancel culture is used as an umbrella term for (at least) two different kinds of ‘cancelling’. Cancelling is often seen in public debate as punishment. Following Radzik’s objections to social punishment we argue that this kind of cancelling is morally reprehensible. However, cancel culture as an umbrella term also includes other kinds of cancelling. Many also refer to cancel culture as a phenomenon when someone is being called out or held accountable for their supposedly problematic behaviour. Such cancelling does not need to be punishment, but is often rather an attempt to remove privileged access to the public sphere. In this way, cancelling is used as a tool for redistributing attention: it can (re)claim attention and recognition for marginalized perspectives, by a radical attempt to deny a privileged person access to the public sphere. We conclude that cancel culture as a whole cannot be seen as either morally good or bad, because ‘cancelling’ can be used as a tool for both punishment and redistribution. Each have their own moral implications: cancelling as punishment is reprehensible, but cancelling to redistribute attention might be less of a problem.