How to cancel the Knobe effect: the role of sufficiently strong moral censure

American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):181-186 (2021)
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Abstract

Empirical support is offered for the claim that the original Knobe effect, whereby our intentional action ascriptions exhibit certain asymmetries in light of our moral attitudes, can be successfully cancelled. This is predicted by the view that the Knobe effect can be explained in purely pragmatic terms (Adams and Steadman 2004a, 2004b, 2007). However, previous cancelling studies (Adams and Steadman 2007; Nichols and Ulatowski 2007) have failed to identify evidence of cancellability. The key to the successful cancelling strategy presented here is to provide subjects with the opportunity to assent to statements that involve sufficiently strong forms of moral censure.

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Author Profiles

Matthew Lindauer
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Nicholas Southwood
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Experimental moral philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.
Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano & Don Loeb - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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