Abstract

It is common for scholars sympathetic to religion – from Friedrich Schleiermacher to the present – to describe the modern critics of religious experience as reductionist. By this they mean these critics do not respect religion for what it is; they rather ‘attempt to assimilate religion to nonreligious phenomena’,1 say, primitive science or metaphysics. Needless to say, these scholars consider this incorrect.Into this scene strides Wayne Proudfoot. In his award‐winning book Religious Experience2 he sets out to scrutinize this accusation and rehabilitate the modern critics. He dismisses this accusation as a protective strategy to render religious claims immune to rational critique. His rehabilitation program is based on a distinction he draws between two kinds of reduction – descriptive and explanatory. This distinction has so caught the imagination of philosophers that it has found its way into textbooks.3 On the other hand, the book is also controversial; needless to say, its claims are problematic for believers.The purpose of my paper is not to offer a comprehensive critique of his book, but only of his methodology, or the lack thereof, where methodology is understood as an integrated set of tools used for inquiry. I argue that although he proposes description and explanation as appropriate instruments for the study of religious experience, the two do not constitute a methodology, because his descriptions play no role in his explanations; rather, both go their separate ways. I argue that explanation must be guided by description. Moreover, I distinguish three kinds of inquiry, each calling for a different kind of description. The kind of description Proudfoot recommends is appropriate for genetic inquiry into how particular experiences came about, but not for a conceptual inquiry into the constitutive elements of religious experience. He knows lots of trees (particular experiences), but misses the wood (the nature of religious experience). Thus my title.The paper is divided into three parts. First is a brief presentation of Proudfoot's thesis. A second part analyses three different kinds of inquiry; it shows that genetic and epistemic explanations are logically independent and irreducible one to another. These different types of inquiry call for distinct types of description, and these descriptions in turn guide the explanation that will be considered satisfactory. The context‐sensitivity of descriptions, and their relation to explanation is dealt with in the final part. Let us start with Proudfoot's contention.