Abstract Stephen Jay Gould's NOMA (nonoverlapping magisteria) theory was meant to be an alternative to the traditional “conflict model” regarding the relationship between science and religion. But NOMA has been plagued with problems from the beginning. The problem most acutely felt was that of demarcating the disciplines of science and theology. This paper is an attempt to retain the insights of NOMA and the conflict model, while eliminating their shortcomings. It acknowledges with the conflict model that the conflict is real, (...) but not necessarily a fight unto death. It agrees with the NOMA that the two are different kinds of disciplines, and it goes on to spell out the difference in some detail. They turn out to be so radically different that the two cannot be reconciled by keeping one away from the other's turf, as NOMA suggests, but may be reconciled through a fusion of horizons in the Gadamerian sense. (shrink)

To discuss the rationality of religious beliefs of the meaning of those beliefs must be made intelligible, sometimes to those who do not share our presuppositions. Is it possible to explain the meaning of such basic concepts as ‘Religion’, and ‘God’ without presupposing other religious concepts? The present paper is an attempt at such a radical interpretation of religion. This is done by wedding a full‐fledged constructivist epistemology with insights from the mystical traditions of the East and the West. How (...) such an epistemology can account for both the unity and plurality of religions is also indicated. In the process I give not only a new interpretation of ‘God’ but also suggest the reasons for the failure of the “proofs” for the existence of God. Thus, a new way is opened up for discussing the rationality of religious beliefs. (shrink)

It is common for scholars sympathetic to religion – from Friedrich Schleiermacher to the present – to describe the modern critics of religious experience as reductionist. By this they mean these critics do not respect religion for what it is; they rather ‘attempt to assimilate religion to nonreligious phenomena’,1 say, primitive science or metaphysics. Needless to say, these scholars consider this incorrect.Into this scene strides Wayne Proudfoot. In his award‐winning book Religious Experience2 he sets out to scrutinize this accusation and (...) rehabilitate the modern critics. He dismisses this accusation as a protective strategy to render religious claims immune to rational critique. His rehabilitation program is based on a distinction he draws between two kinds of reduction – descriptive and explanatory. This distinction has so caught the imagination of philosophers that it has found its way into textbooks.3 On the other hand, the book is also controversial; needless to say, its claims are problematic for believers.The purpose of my paper is not to offer a comprehensive critique of his book, but only of his methodology, or the lack thereof, where methodology is understood as an integrated set of tools used for inquiry. I argue that although he proposes description and explanation as appropriate instruments for the study of religious experience, the two do not constitute a methodology, because his descriptions play no role in his explanations; rather, both go their separate ways. I argue that explanation must be guided by description. Moreover, I distinguish three kinds of inquiry, each calling for a different kind of description. The kind of description Proudfoot recommends is appropriate for genetic inquiry into how particular experiences came about, but not for a conceptual inquiry into the constitutive elements of religious experience. He knows lots of trees (particular experiences), but misses the wood (the nature of religious experience). Thus my title.The paper is divided into three parts. First is a brief presentation of Proudfoot's thesis. A second part analyses three different kinds of inquiry; it shows that genetic and epistemic explanations are logically independent and irreducible one to another. These different types of inquiry call for distinct types of description, and these descriptions in turn guide the explanation that will be considered satisfactory. The context‐sensitivity of descriptions, and their relation to explanation is dealt with in the final part. Let us start with Proudfoot's contention. (shrink)

It is thought that Schleiermacher used religious experience as a new kind of argument to safeguard Christian faith when he was faced with the failure of traditional arguments for the existence of God. This paper argues that such a view does not do justice to the newness of his approach in constructing a propaedeutic to Christian theology. It is further argued that, irrespective of whether one agrees with what Schleiermacher was trying to do, if religious experience is to become a (...) contemporary preambula fidei to Christian theology, the focus should be on communicating a positive experience rather than on arguing for God's existence. (shrink)

It is thought that Schleiermacher used religious experience as a new kind of argument to safeguard Christian faith when he was faced with the failure of traditional arguments for the existence of God. This paper argues that such a view does not do justice to the newness of his approach in constructing a propaedeutic to Christian theology. It is further argued that, irrespective of whether one agrees with what Schleiermacher was trying to do, if religious experience is to become a (...) contemporary preambula fidei to Christian theology, the focus should be on communicating a positive experience rather than on arguing for God's existence. (shrink)

Meeting held on the theme "Dynamics of religion: philosophical review from Indian perspectives".