The Moral Justification for Environmentalism

Dissertation, Boston University Graduate School (1983)
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the ethical relationship between humanity and the natural environment by investigating the moral justification of a policy of environmentalism. Various moral arguments are analyzed to see which provide the grounds for a serious policy of environmental protection. ;Arguments based on the promotion of human interests are rejected because of their mere instrumental consideration of the processes and entities in the natural environment. Since the existence of the natural environment is only contingently related to the furtherance of human interests, human interests may be sought as the goal of action without regard for environmental protection. ;Arguments based on moral obligations to future generations of humans are rejected primarily because of the uncertainty of the size, character, and interests of the future human population. If the time-frame of the argument is limited to the next few generations, so that the size and character of the human population can be known, then the arguments are not essentially different from the human interest arguments previously rejected. ;An environmental ethic is proposed as the justification of a policy of environmentalism. An environmental ethic considers the natural entities in the environment or even the environment itself as worthy of moral respect. Interpretations of an environmental ethic are considered for plausibility, coherence, and agreement with proper environmental practice. Models of individual moral consideration are rejected because of the difficulty and implausibility of ascertaining the interests of individual natural entities. Thus a model of moral community is developed, in which humans owe moral obligations to natural ecosystemic communities in their entirety. Animals, plants, and rocks do not have moral worth as individuals, but as functioning members of a moral-ecological community. ;To answer objections based on the traditional primacy of human interest in the determination of moral value, a criterion for human intervention in the natural environment is developed. This criterion is based on the health or regenerative capacity of the moral-natural community of which humanity is a part. This moral and ecological criterion provides the substantive content of the environmental ethic and the grounds for justifying a policy of environmentalism

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