Incomplete stimulus representations and the loss of cognitive access in cerebral achromatopsia

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):508-509 (2007)
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Abstract

When processing of stimuli occurs without attention, phenomenal experience, as well as cognitive access, may be lost. Sensory representations are, however, constructed by neural machinery extending far beyond sensory receptors. In conditions such as cerebral achromatopsia incomplete sensory representations may still elicit phenomenal experience but these representations might be too aberrant to be integrated into the wider cognitive workspace

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