The impossibility of naturalism: The antinomies of Bhaskar's realism

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (3):267–288 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

From the publication of The Possibility of Naturalism, Bhaskar’s critical naturalism or realism has argued for a dualistic social ontology of interpreting individuals and objective, ‘real’ social structures. In arguing for a dualistic ontology, Bhaskar commits himself to two antinomies; he insists that society is dependent on individuals but also independent of them, and that social action is always intentional but it also has non-intentional, material features. These antinomies are apparently resolved by appeals to emergence. In fact, the appeal to emergence is merely a disguised regression into reification and the only genuine path out of these antinomies is the adoption of a fully hermeneutic social theory in line with the positions of Winch and Gadamer

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
3 (#1,729,579)

6 months
23 (#125,194)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Nonreductive individualism: Part I—supervenience and wild disjunction.R. Keith Sawyer - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):537-559.
For emergence: Refining Archer's account of social structure.Dave Elder-Vass - 2007 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (1):25–44.
Nonreductive individualism part II—social causation.R. Keith Sawyer - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2):203-224.
Nonreductive Individualism.Sawyer R. Keith - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):537-559.
Elder-Vass on the Causal Power of Social Structures.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6):774-791.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references