Synthese:1-12 (forthcoming)

Authors
Manuel Lechthaler
University of Strathclyde
Abstract
Philosophers disagree whether composition as identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker :264–294, 2016) has recently considered an argument which concludes that composition as identity supports universalism. The key step in this argument is the thesis that any objects are identical to some object, which Bricker justifies with the principle of the universality of identity. I will spell out this principle in more detail and argue that it has an unexpected consequence. If the universality of identity holds, then composition as identity not only leads us to universalism, but also leads to the view that there are no mereological atoms.
Keywords Composition as Identity  universalism  gunk  universality of identity  mereology
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02122-y
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References found in this work BETA

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Structure of Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics.Phillip Bricker (ed.) - 2020 - Oxford University Press.

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