Mathematical Explanation in Practice

Axiomathes 31 (5):553-574 (2021)
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Abstract

The connection between understanding and explanation has recently been of interest to philosophers. Inglis and Mejía-Ramos (Synthese, 2019) propose that within mathematics, we should accept a functional account of explanation that characterizes explanations as those things that produce understanding. In this paper, I start with the assumption that this view of mathematical explanation is correct and consider what we can consequently learn about mathematical explanation. I argue that this view of explanation suggests that we should shift the question of explanation away from why-questions and towards a “what’s going on here” question. Additionally, I argue that when we recognize the connection between understanding and explanation we naturally see how more than just proof can be explanatory. I expand this point by detailing how definitions and diagrams can be explanatory. In all, we see that when we take seriously the connection between understanding and explanation, we get a better sense of how explanation arises within mathematics.

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Ellen Lehet
Lees-McRae College

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References found in this work

The nature of mathematical knowledge.Philip Kitcher - 1983 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Explanatory unification.Philip Kitcher - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.
Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world.Philip Kitcher - 1989 - In Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 410-505.

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