In Ken Gemes & John Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Brian Leiter
University of Chicago
Abstract
This article revisits the author’s influential account of Nietzche as a philosophical naturalist. It identifies the sources of Nietzsche’s position in the German naturalism of the mid-nineteenth century, in particular the work of Friedrich Lange. His naturalism is, however, “speculative” in that he postulates causal mechanisms not confirmed by science. Nietzsche’s ambition to explain morality naturalistically coexists with a “therapeutic” ambition to induce some readers to escape from morality. The article also addresses doubts that might arise against reading Nietzsche as a naturalist.
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DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199534647.013.0026
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References found in this work BETA

The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.

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Citations of this work BETA

Freedom, Resistance, Agency.Manuel Dries - 2015 - In Peter Kail & Manuel Dries (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Oxford University Press. pp. 142–162.
Deleuze and Naturalism.Paul Patton - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):348-364.
‘Pain Always Asks for a Cause’: Nietzsche and Explanation.Matthew Bennett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1550-1568.

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