Abstract

This dissertation is an analysis of Otto Kernberg's object relations theory, with special attention to the manner in which his central concepts and proposed mechanisms are formulated. Object relations theories are a set of post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories focusing on the infant's earliest relations with its significant others and the effects this has on adult personality and psychopathology. All of these theories rely on some concept of internal objects, the internal representations of such object relations. Kernberg's theory has been chosen because of his clarity on fundamental definitions as well as for his place in the historical development of such theories. ;The thesis of this dissertation is that Kernberg's version of object relations theory can be reconstructed into a form which: is credible in contemporary debates on the nature of mind and provides for a truly psychological level of explanation; is compatible with recent developments in other branches of psychology; and loses none of the explanatory power or heuristic import which Kernberg claims for it. ;The philosophical context for this case study is a recent set of responses to the earlier, primarily negative philosophical evaluations of psychoanalysis. One central issue concerns the sense in which and the extent to which psychoanalysis can offer explanations for behavior. While arguing that a hermeneutic interpretation of psychoanalytic theories is stultifying and not true to what most psychoanalytic theorists take their theories to be about, this study presents arguments for a type of functionalist analysis as a structure for psychoanalytic theories. Examples are given of arguments by other theorists reformulating aspects of Freud's theories into such a functionalist programme. The remainder of the dissertation is taken up with a detailed analysis to show how Kernberg's theory might be so reformulated, with special attention to his description and explanation of the borderline personality disorder