Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):460-476 (2020)

Authors
Max Lewis
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements. First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods should be off-putting. Second, I argue that moral deference is sometimes superior to these other methods because it puts one in a better position to gain the relevant moral achievements.
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DOI 10.1017/can.2019.56
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References found in this work BETA

Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.
A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deference and Ideals of Practical Agency.Jonathan Knutzen - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):17-32.

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