Why Dignity is not the Foundation of Human Rights

Public Reason 8 (1-2) (2016)
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Abstract

This essay questions what is argued by many scholars today, namely that the moral concept of human dignity provides the basis for the establishment of human rights. More specifically, I critically discuss the two most prominent conceptions of human dignity, the ‘status’ and the ‘value’ conceptions of dignity, which are suggested today as the foundations of human rights. Ultimately, I propose a different, ‘duty-based’ philosophical account for the justification of the latter.

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Stamatina Liosi
University of Kent (PhD)

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Practical philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.
Dignity, Rank, and Rights.Jeremy Waldron - 2012 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
Towards Justice and Virtue.Onora O'neill - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1103-1105.
Justice and Equality.Gregory Vlastos - 1997 - In Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland (eds.), Equality: Selected Readings. Oup Usa.

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