Authors
Douglas C. Long
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
In my essay I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, one does not have direct cpistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since the self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. Third, we cannot claim, as Descartes did, that we have indirect epistemic access to the substantial self by inference from the occurrence of experiences.The summary conclusion for which I argue is that, if we are to account for our self-knowledge, we cannot adopt the purely subjective epistemological stance that is at the heart of global skepticism.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind  Epistemology  Skepticism  Transcendental argument  Self-knowledge
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr1994542106
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