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  1. Unger's Defense of Skepticism: New Wine in Old Bottles.Shane Andre - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):453 - 465.
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  2. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Review).Stanley Bates - 1980 - Philosophy and Literature 4 (2):266-273.
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  3. Sceptical Essays.Jose Benardete - 1982 - Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):463-464.
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  4. Die Welt Als Grund: Wittgenstein, Gadamer Und James.Núria Sara Miras Boronat - 2011 - Akten des XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie.
  5. Wittgenstein and Scepticism.Aryeh Botwinick - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:163-176.
    A unifying perspective to bring to bear on Wittgenstein’s thought is that it represents a continual grappling with the problem of formulating a consistent version of scepticism--one that would not succumb to the charge of being self-refuting. His ultimate resolution of this problem hinges upon the precise content to be invested in his famous philosophical doctrine of the priority of Gezeigt (showing) over Gezagt (saying). I shall argue for a democratic participatory gloss of this doctrine as offering the most satisfactory (...)
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  6. Mr. Strawson and Skepticism.M. C. Bradley - 1959 - Analysis 20 (1):14 - 19.
  7. Philosophical Skepticism and Ordinary Language Analysis.Stuart C. Brown - 1981 - Philosophical Books 22 (1):48-50.
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  8. Epistemic Contextualism and Linguistic Behavior.Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 44-56.
    Epistemic contextualism is the theory that “knows” is a context sensitive expression. As a linguistic theory, epistemic contextualism is motivated by claims about the linguistic behavior of competent speakers. This chapter reviews evidence in experimental cognitive science for epistemic contextualism in linguistic behavior. This research demonstrates that although some observations that are consistent with epistemic contextualism can be confirmed in linguistic practices, these observations are also equally well explained both by psychological features that do not provide support for contextualism and (...)
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  9. Knowledge and Scepticism.Thomas O. Buford - 1985 - Review of Metaphysics 38 (3):671-673.
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  10. Philosophy and Language Learning.Steinar Bøyum - 2007 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (1):43-56.
    In this paper, I explore different ways of picturing language learning in philosophy, all of them inspired by Wittgenstein and all of them concerned about scepticism of meaning. I start by outlining the two pictures of children and language learning that emerge from Kripke's famous reading of Wittgenstein. Next, I explore how social-pragmatic readings, represented by Meredith Williams, attempt to answer the sceptical anxieties. Finally, drawing somewhat on Stanley Cavell, I try to resolve these issues by investigating what characteristically happens (...)
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  11. Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
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  12. Stroud, Austin, and Radical Skepticism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2016 - Sképsis 14:57-75.
    Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...)
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  13. Reply to Four Chapters.Stanley Cavell - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge.
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  14. In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism.Stanley Cavell - 1988 - University of Chicago Press.
    These lectures by one of the most influential and original philosophers of the twentieth century constitute a sustained argument for the philosophical basis of romanticism, particularly in its American rendering. Through his examination of such authors as Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, Stanley Cavell shows that romanticism and American transcendentalism represent a serious philosophical response to the challenge of skepticism that underlies the writings of Wittgenstein and Austin on ordinary language.
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  15. Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein.C. Chihara & Jerry A. Fodor - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):281-95.
    This paper explores some lines of argument in wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, On the one hand, And his philosophy of language, His epistemology, And his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other. The authors maintain that the later writings of wittgenstein express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism." they also maintain (...)
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  16. Empirical Equivalence and Skeptical Methodology: The Case of the Switched Words.David Phiroze Christensen - 1987 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In this dissertation, I study the strategy of giving semantical replies to skeptical puzzles. I concentrate on a very simple kind of puzzle, which seems to invite--and perhaps even require--semantical responses. ;Skeptical problems of this kind, which I call "switched-words" problems, are based on alternative hypotheses about the world which are structurally very similar to our standard hypotheses; for example, it has been asked how we can justify choosing our standard physical theory over an alternative hypothesis formulated by taking the (...)
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  17. Meaning, Mistake, and Miscalculation.Paul Coates - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
    The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact (...)
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  18. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  19. Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In?201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous? rule - following paradox.? The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule? the applications of which are potentially infinite? when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule - following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical (...)
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  20. Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language.Craig Stephen Delancey - 2007 - Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
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  21. Scepticism, Rules and Language.Cora Diamond - 1985 - Philosophical Books 26 (1):26-29.
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  22. Wittgenstein and the Question of Linguistic Idealism.Ilham Dilman - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. pp. 162--177.
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  23. Naturalisme et scepticisme chez Cavell, McDowell et Strawson. Les héritages contemporains d'une question humienne.Élise Domenach - forthcoming - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.
    Quelles sont les relations entre naturalisme et scepticisme, après Hume, chez trois philosophes contemporains, trois « nouveaux sceptiques », héritiers de la philosophie du langage ordinaire ? Nous est-il naturel de douter de notre accès au monde ? Le naturalisme doit-il permettre de rejeter la question sceptique comme nonnaturelle, ou au contraire de reconnaître la façon dont le scepticisme traverse notre langage ordinaire ? En distinguant différents naturalismes d'après le concept de nature auquel ils font appel et selon leur position (...)
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  24. Moore's Paradox, Asserting and Skepticism.Katheryn Doran - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):41-48.
  25. Hegel, Wittgenstein, and the Dialectic of Philosophy and Anthropology.Bo Earle - 2002 - Idealistic Studies 32 (2):101-119.
    The early Hegel and late Wittgenstein alike suggest that the idealism-realism contrast is better understood as a contrast between normative and naturalistic accounts of actions. Building upon parallels between Hegel’s account of the “inverted world” and what Kripke called Wittgenstein’s “skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox,” I suggest that Wittgensteinian rule following may involve not only first personal commitments, as Lear argues, but also something like the specifically historical agency Hegel called Geist, and that, in turn, Hegel’s “Absolute” may be (...)
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  26. Philosophical Scepticism.Kenneth Stanley Ferguson - 1980 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    This treatment of scepticism is then shown to have important consequences for a wide range of issues in epistemology. Some of these are the following: that transcendental arguments are unsound because they presuppose a mistaken account of the sense in which we know what we take ourselves to know; that the technical notion of a criterion Wittgenstein employs in the Investigations involves a confusion which results from a failure to appreciate the role of background presuppositions in our epistemic discourse in (...)
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  27. Wittgenstein and Classical Scepticism.Robert J. Fogelin - 1981 - International Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):3-15.
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  28. Imagining Wittgenstein's Adolescent: The Educational Significance of Expression.Jeff Frank - 2012 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (4):343-350.
    This paper highlights the philosophical and educational significance of expression in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. When the role of expression is highlighted, we will be better able to appreciate Stanley Cavell's insistence that: (i) Wittgenstein offers ways of responding to, though not a refutation of, the problem of skepticism concerning other minds, and (ii) Wittgenstein's writing style is an important aspect of his philosophy. The educational implications of this appreciation will be explored with reference to the lives of adolescences.
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  29. Skepticism, Ordinary Language and Zen Buddhism.Dick Garner - 1977 - Philosophy East and West 27 (2):165-181.
    The goal of tranquility through non-Assertion, Advocated by sextus empiricus, Is examined and his method criticized. His understanding of non-Assertion is compared with that of seng-Chao (383-414) and chi-Tsang (549-623). Zen buddhism shares the quest for tranquility, But offers more than sextus did to help us attain it, And avoids the excessively metaphysical thought of these two chinese buddhists. Wittgenstein, Whose goal was that philosophical problems completely disappear, And austin, Who rejected many standard western dichotomies, Offer a method superior to (...)
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  30. An Anti-Sceptical Fugue.Grant Gillett - 1990 - Philosophical Investigations 13 (4):304-321.
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  31. Philosophical Skepticism and Ordinary-Language Analysis. By Garrett L. Vander Veer.Jack Gilroy - 1980 - Modern Schoolman 57 (2):194-195.
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  32. Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
  33. Stroud's Defence of Cartesian Scepticism -A 'Linguistic' Response.Hans-Johann Glock - 1990 - Philosophical Investigations 13 (1):44-64.
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  34. Solipsism and the Solitary Language User.Irwin Goldstein - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, is (...)
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  35. The Experiential Foundations of Mathematical Knowledge.Nicolas D. Goodman - 1981 - History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1-2):55-65.
    A view of the sources of mathematical knowledge is sketched which emphasizes the close connections between mathematical and empirical knowledge. A platonistic interpretation of mathematical discourse is adopted throughout. Two skeptical views are discussed and rejected. One of these, due to Maturana, is supposed to be based on biological considerations. The other, due to Dummett, is derived from a Wittgensteinian position in the philosophy of language. The paper ends with an elaboration of Gödel's analogy between the mathematician and the physicist.
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  36. Vander Veer, G. L. "Philosophical Skepticism and Ordinary-Language Analysis". [REVIEW]C. K. Grant - 1980 - Mind 89:312.
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  37. La teoria della memoria di Reid in contesto.Andrea Guardo - 2013 - In Saggio sulla memoria. Mimesis.
    An introduction to Thomas Reid’s epistemology and philosophy of mind, written for the Italian translation of his essay on memory.
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  38. Kripke's Account of the Rule-Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    I argue that most of the alleged straight solutions to Kripke's Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. I then argue that the dilemma is a by-product of an unnecessary foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification and is therefore spurious. Finally, I outline an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behavior which vindicates some of the insights behind Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution of the paradox.
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  39. Il Mito del Dato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Mimesis.
    A critique of John McDowell’s theory of content, with special emphasis on his reading of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.
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  40. Su che cosa si pretende dal significato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Acme – Annali Della Facoltà di Lettere E Filosofia Dell’Università Degli Studi di Milano 62 (1):335-347.
    A defence of a relativist view of rule-following. The paper is a précis of “Il Mito del Dato”.
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  41. Come faccio a sapere che questo colore è rosso?Andrea Guardo - 2007 - In Simona Chiodo & Paolo Valore (eds.), Questioni di metafisica contemporanea. Il Castoro.
    A commentary on § 381 of part I of the “Philosophical Investigations”, published in the proceedings of the conference Esperienza e Giudizio.
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  42. Rule-Scepticism Restated.Riccardo Guastini - 2011 - In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.
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  43. Scepticism and Absurdity.Ingemund Gullv - 1964 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):163 – 190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as 'absurd' in some sense of violating 'rules' of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like 'know', or 'knowledge', as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  44. Scepticism and Absurdity.Ingemund Gullvåg - 1964 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):163-190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as ?absurd? in some sense of violating ?rules? of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like ?know?, or ?knowledge?, as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  45. The Philosophy of J. L. Austin.Martin Gustafsson & Richard Sørli (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    These new essays on J. L. Austin's philosophy constitute the first major study of his thought in decades.
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  46. Garrett L. Vander Veer's "Philosophical Skepticism and Ordinary-Language Analysis". [REVIEW]Edward A. Hacker - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (3):452.
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  47. Rules, Scepticism, Proof, Wittgenstein.Ian Hacking - 1985 - In Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  48. Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'.Adrian Haddock - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
    I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt (...)
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  49. Justification and Praxeological Foundationalism.Rudolf Haller - 1988 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):335 – 345.
    At least since Descartes the epistemological turn derived its impetus from the sceptical challenge to provide a justification for all knowledge claims. According to a foundational view, a claim to know something is justified only when the justification refers to ultimate grounds in the form of self?supporting propositions. This paper's title suggests that justification may be seen from a different perspective, namely that of acting. Wittgenstein's examples show that the sceptic's maxim ? doubt everything ? breaks down because some beliefs (...)
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  50. Scepticism and Meaning.Stuart Hampshire - 1950 - Philosophy 25 (94):235 - 246.
    1. It is a commonplace that contemporary empiricism, or antimetaphysical philosophy, at least in this country, is a re-statement of the essentials of Hume's position with the aid of the more complete analysis of a priori reasoning provided by logicians within the last fifty years; what logical empiricism has most substantially added to Hume's sceptical method is the means of stating and applying his distinction between purely analytic sentences and sentences conveying information about matters of fact more precisely than he (...)
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